Pepperdine University

Pepperdine Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2013

Founder succession in small businesses
Mike Parkhurst

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Parkhurst, Mike, "Founder succession in small businesses" (2013). Theses and Dissertations. 324.
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/etd/324

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Pepperdine University
Graduate School of Education and Psychology

FOUNDER SUCCESSION IN SMALL BUSINESSES

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Education in Organizational Leadership
by
Mike Parkhurst
February, 2013
Kent Rhodes, Ed. D – Dissertation Chairperson

This dissertation, written by

Michael S. Parkhurst
under the guidance of a Faculty Committee and approved by its members, has been
submitted to and accepted by the Graduate Faculty in partial fulfillment to the
requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

Doctoral Committee:

Kent Rhodes, Ed.D., Chairperson

Mark Allen, Ph. D.

Jeffery Decker, Ph. D.

© Copyright by Michael S. Parkhurst (2013)
All Rights Reserve

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................x
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... xi
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................1
The Problem .....................................................................................................................1
Purpose of the Research ...................................................................................................4
Research Questions ..........................................................................................................6
Operational Definitions ....................................................................................................7
Importance of the Research .............................................................................................8
Limitations of the Research .............................................................................................9
Summary ........................................................................................................................10
Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................11
General Succession Research ........................................................................................11
Successor Origins...........................................................................................................14
Firm Size and Succession Rate ......................................................................................17
Precursors to Succession ................................................................................................18
Industry and Environmental Factors ..............................................................................24
Contingencies for Succession Success...........................................................................25
Succession Planning.......................................................................................................26
Consequences of Succession (Non-market Related) .....................................................28
Sport Team Performance ...............................................................................................31
Business Performance ....................................................................................................33
Frequency of Succession................................................................................................35
Matching Successors to Organizational Needs ..............................................................37
Family Succession .........................................................................................................37
Founder Studies .............................................................................................................38
Founders are Different From Other CEOs .....................................................................42
Why Replace the Founder ..............................................................................................44
Various Succession Models ...........................................................................................46

Page
Summary ........................................................................................................................52
Chapter Three: Research Methodology .............................................................................54
Purpose...........................................................................................................................54
Research Method ...........................................................................................................54
Target Population, Sample Size, and Data Collection Method .....................................56
Data Analysis .................................................................................................................65
Considerations for Use of Human Subjects ...................................................................70
Possible Study Limitations ............................................................................................71
Summary ........................................................................................................................72
Chapter Four: Results ........................................................................................................73
Data Collection ..............................................................................................................73
Interviewee Profiles .......................................................................................................74
Data Acquisition Methodology ......................................................................................74
Analysis of Interview Questions ....................................................................................76
Analysis of Interview Questions 1 through 6 ................................................................80
Analysis of Interview Question 7 ..................................................................................81
Analysis of Interview Questions 8 Through 11 .............................................................82
Analysis of Interview Question 13 ................................................................................84
Analysis of Interview Question 14 ................................................................................85
Analysis of Interview Question 15 ................................................................................86
Analysis of Interview Question 16 ................................................................................87
Analysis of Interview Question 17 ................................................................................87
Analysis of Interview Question 18 ................................................................................88
Analysis of Interview Question 19 ................................................................................88
Analysis of Interview Question 20 ................................................................................89
Analysis of Interview Question 21 ................................................................................89
Analysis of Interview Question 22 ................................................................................90
Analysis of Interview Question 23 ................................................................................91
Analysis of Interview Question 24 ................................................................................92
Analysis of Interview Question 25 ................................................................................93
Themes ...........................................................................................................................93
Comparison Between Model and Interviews Responses ...............................................97
Did the Founders Plan for Succession .........................................................................107
How Might the Succession Process Been Improved ...................................................107
Themes Related to Research Question and Interview Questions ................................108
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................112
Chapter Five: Results .......................................................................................................115
Discussion of Research Questions ...............................................................................115
v

Page
Discussion of Discovered Themes ...............................................................................123
Recommendations ........................................................................................................126
Limitations of the Study...............................................................................................138
Recommendations for Future Research .......................................................................141
Conclusions ..................................................................................................................143
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................144
APPENDIX A: Interview Questions ...............................................................................159
APPENDIX B: Informed Consent Form .........................................................................162

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1. Mapping of Independent Research Variables to Research Questions ................67
Table 2. Profiles of Participating Successors .....................................................................75
Table 3. Average Scores for Questions 4 Through 23 .......................................................78
Table 4. Discovered Themes..............................................................................................94

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1. Average scores for importance on the succession event. ...................................80

viii

DEDICATION
I dedicate this work to my wife,
Ronniejean Parkhurst
who has unceasingly inspired me to achieve more than I ever thought possible.

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To my dissertation chair, Dr. Kent Rhodes thanks for your support, advice, and
availability.
To my committee members, Dr. Mark Allen for teaching me what it means to
educate adults, and to Dr. Jeffery Decker who has taught me more than anyone what it
means to be a Christian witness in the workplace.
To John Alderson, a true friend, a genuine caring human being, and a Christian
brother who started me on the road to my graduate degrees, gave me the courage to speak
in public, and now to teach. Thank you my friend for your gifts to me, I pray I can honor
you by doing them well.
To Dr. Tom Granoff for the number of discussions about my dissertation that kept
me on course.
To my cohort whose support and friendship motivated me to complete my studies
at Pepperdine.
To the participants who have participated in my study; I would like to thank them
for their time and contributions to this research.

x

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is twofold. The first is to replicate and expand on previous
studies by Rubenson and Gupta (1992, 1996) who introduced a contingency model for
the initial succession of an organization. The second purpose is to verify that their model
is applicable to organizations that are substantially smaller than the original 54 Fortune
1000 companies that were studied. The researcher used a qualitative research
methodology to answer the following research questions.
1. Is the Contingency Model of the Initial Succession proposed by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) transferable to organizations of smaller size and lower revenues?
2. Were the founders of small sized organizations planning for their eventual
succession?
3. What other factors came into play beyond those outlined by Rubenson and Gupta
(1996) during the succession process?
The qualitative research methodology employed was a grounded theory research design
utilizing personal interviews with the first successors of an organization. The researcher
used a combination of structured and unstructured questions during the interviews of 15
successor CEOs about the process of succession from the founder to them as the next
organizational leader. Participants in this study were chosen by a combination of
purposeful sampling and chain referencing methods. All the participants and
organizations in this study met the following criteria: (a) the interviewed successor must
be the first leader after the founder, (b) the organizations must have been between $5 and
$200 million dollars in annual revenue at the time of succession, (c) the organizations
xi

must have had 200 employees or less at the time of succession, and (d) the succession
must either be in process or have happened within the last 5 years.
The results of this study suggest that founders who maintain a controlling equity position
in their organizations are able to set the date and method of their succession with
impunity. Only 6 of the 12 sub-factors in the model for the initial succession were
confirmed in the sample population of this study. It is the authors conclusion that the
proposed model by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) as it is currently constructed had
minimal explanatory power in the target population of this study. Additionally, 6 themes
were discovered during the interview process: founders are thinking in terms of how to
cash out of the business rather than their legacy; founders are not planning for succession
until it is thrust upon them by illness, old age, or by their family; founders did whatever
they wanted because they were the majority shareholder; successors are not inclined to
confront the founder; founders have a high level of self identification with the
organization; and founders hung onto the organization because it was their hobby.

xii

Chapter 1: Introduction
The following paper is a research paper is about the applicability of the
Contingency Model for the Initial Succession (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996) to smaller
organizations. Chapter 1 will discuss the reasons why the subject of founder succession
needs further study. Chapter 2 will provide a summary of the literature that has already
been published on the issue. Chapter 3 will explain the research methodology that was
used in this research project. Chapter 4 will review and present an analysis of the data
that was gather in the study. Chapter 5 will discuss the implications of the results of the
study as well as present a series of recommendations for founders, successors, and
members of the board of directors. The first section of chapter 1 will describe the
problems associated with the initial succession in an organization, as well as the general
background of founder succession research. Next, there will be a section on the purpose
for the study, as well as the limitations of the study. Lastly, there will be a discussion on
the significance of the problem and why research on this subject was pursued.
The Problem
All organizations have a beginning. The first person to lead the organization is
often called the founder due to the activities that surround the birth of the organization.
They are the ones that imbue the organization with its values and mission. From raising
capital, to finding the first customers, to hiring staff as the organization grows, the first
leader of an organization lays the foundation upon which the organization establishes
itself and develops. According to Drucker (1954), top management is critical to both the
success and survival of the organization. The CEO has the ability to define and control
the strategy of their company and actively determine which opportunities to pursue
1

(Wasserman, 2003). Often these CEO-founders are entrepreneurial in nature who are
building a company from scratch and expect one day to hand off the operation to an heir,
to sell the company to a third party, or even to take the company public in a stock
offering. Even those founders who are intending to build a family business still have to
make a decision as to whether they transfer control of their company to a family member
or to a professional manager who would run the business, but who would not own the
business. Research has shown that second generation CEOs often exhibit poor
performance as compared to non-related CEOs (Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, &
Wolfenzon, 2007).
Despite many years of research, the process of founder succession is still not fully
understood. With a 70% failure rate in transitioning a firm from the founder to the next
leader in an organization, it has become obvious that our current understanding of the
succession process is inadequate. The amount of literature describing succession is quite
large, with the overwhelming balance of this literature being focused on corporate
succession where the pattern of passing control from one leader to another is an already
established practice. What is largely lacking are studies that delve into the first succession
that an organization experiences, namely the founder succession. The primary reason for
this dearth of data is that when a firm fails in a founder succession the data about that
succession dies with the firm. With only a 30% success rate in founder transitions, the
other 70% of the data about founder succession goes missing.
According to Beckhard and Dyer (1983) family controlled businesses accounted
for 14.4 of the 15 million businesses in 1983. In the United States, 40% of the gross
national product is produced by family controlled businesses (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983).
2

Lastly, the average life span of an organization, according to Beckhard and Dyer (1983),
is approximately 24 years, which also happens to be the average time a founder leads a
business. When a founder passes control to a second generation family member, only 3
out of 10 of the businesses survive (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983). The passing to a third
generation is even worse (Pérez-González, 2006).
Any organization that exists for more than a few years eventually has to face the
problem of changing the leader of the organization. The process of changing leaders is
called succession. Succession happens in all forms of an organization. Corporations
change CEO’s, University Presidents retire, business are bought and sold, privately held
firms pass from parent to children, and entrepreneurs pass the baton to professional
managers. In other instances, succession happens without warning when the leader
suddenly falls ill or dies. Yet, in some cases it occurs due to poor fiscal performance. In
many cases, the succession event is planned due to retirement of the founder. Naveen
(2006) offered that selecting a successor that aligns with the strategic direction of the
organization and who can keep the organization moving forward after succession is one
of the primary responsibilities of the current CEO and board of directors.
During the last years of the 20th century and during the first 2 years of the 21st
century there was a surge of entrepreneurial activity in what became known as Internet
startup companies. The general concept was to form a startup company that used the
Internet as a central piece of the business plan for the organization, then to acquire a
customer base, attract venture capital to sustain initial operations, and finally to go public
with an initial public stock offering or IPO. The entrepreneurs in these Internet
companies would often have an exit strategy that involved handing off the running of the
3

company to a professional manager because they no longer wish to manage it (Burkart,
Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003). In most cases the exit strategy for the founder was to cash out
of the organization for a profit.
Abrupt changes in leadership are rare and can be very disrupting to the
organization (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996). This is particularly true when there was no plan
for succession in place at the time of leadership change. The planned-for-succession is
much more common and is much less disruptive. In fact, research has shown that a
company’s stock price is often positively affected by the transition of the company leader
(Borokhovich, Brunarski, Donahue, & Harman, 2006). The rise in stock price is often
seen as an anticipation of change in a company’s strategy and direction by the new leader
(Wasserman, 2003). It is the process of first succession from the founder to a non-family
successor, often called founder succession that was the focus of this research.
Purpose of the Research
Even though the process of succession has been studied extensively, almost all of
the studies have been about the transitions of organizations that already have an
established process for succession (Wasserman, 2003). In large established organizations,
the managers are often not the owners. Most of the research literature has been concerned
with an agency perspective where the owner’s interests are different from the managers.
In these cases, the selection and process of the succession are concerned with ensuring
that a successor’s interests are aligned with the owners. In the case of a CEO-founder
succession, the agency perspective does not apply as the founder often has a large percent
(or all) of the controlling ownership interest in the company. This controlling ownership
often allows the founder to set the pace and the circumstances for the succession process.
4

There have been very few studies about the process that a founder goes through in
the initial succession. One of the problems in researching CEO-founder succession is that
most of the organizations are not publicly held. Information about the succession process
is held in private records and for those successions that fail, the records are lost with the
closing of the business. With the large amount of investment capital that was lost when
the Internet bubble burst and also due to the large number of family owned businesses
that contribute a sizeable amount to the national GDP the process of the initial succession
from CEO-founder’s needs to better understood.
Even though the founder is the first leader of the organization, it does not mean
that they have total control of the organization. In some cases, the founder is also the
prime financer. In many cases, the founder needs external financial backing to fund the
startup phase. When this is the case, the causes for succession can also be outside of the
control of the founder. Rubenson and Gupta (1996) proposed a generalized contingency
model for succession that included the possibility that the founder might be forced out
and that the founder might also resist the succession.
In their model, Rubenson and Gupta (1996) articulate three major contingencies
in the decision to proceed to succession. The first is whether the needs of the organization
are changing. This can be because of a changing market place, the size of the firm, or the
growth rate of the organization. Founders who are too busy attempting to generate
revenue might not be giving enough attention to the actual management of the firm (Rea,
1973). The second factor is the ability of the founder to adapt to changes. Founders can
face large challenges in delegating and to shifting to a more mundane management role
(Kansikas, & Kuhmonen, 2008). Lastly, there is the ability of the founder to impede the
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succession. If they do indeed hold a controlling interest in the organization, they might be
able to fend off a forced secession due to poor performance.
It was the purpose of this research to test the explanatory power of the original
study by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) who used 54 Fortune 1000 companies as their
sample target population for another target population which contains organizations that
are much smaller in size. The original study data was found by researching the public
records of 54 Fortune 1000 firms. For this study, the target population were organizations
with between $5 to $200 million dollars in annual revenue and with 200 employees or
less at the time of succession. The limiting values of $200 million and 200 employees are
arbitrary in nature and only meant to limit the size of the target population to small
organizations. Given the importance of the founder transition to the next organizational
leader, the lack of information about the process due to the high number of failed
successions and to the sheer number of small organizations that attempt to go through the
process, it is the goal of this research study to better prepare the founder, the successor,
and the board of directors of an organization for the succession process.
Research Questions
The following three questions are the core of this research proposal:
1) Is the contingency model of founder succession proposed by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) transferable to organizations of smaller size and lower
revenues?
2) Were the founders of small sized organizations planning for their eventual
succession?
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3) What other factors came into play beyond those outlined by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) during the succession process?
Operational Definitions
This section provides some operational definitions used in this research study.
Founder: The person who starts an organization. According to Webster (1828), a
founder is someone who establishes and erects or one who endows. Schein (2004)
suggested that the founders have a critical effect in endowing an organization with its
initial culture and beliefs. If there are two or more entrepreneurs involved in the creation
of the organization, they are collectively referred to as founders.
Family Business: Many of the studies referenced in this proposal have differing
operational definitions of what a family business is. Lam (2009) revealed that scholars
have many conflicting views on how to properly define a family business. For the
purposes of this study, a family business is described by utilizing Rosenblatt, de Mik,
Anderson, and Johnson’s (1985) definition that a family run business is one where a
family owns a controlling interest in the business and one or more family members are
involved in the management of the business.
Non-Family Member: For the purposes of this study the new leader of the
organization would be a person that is not related to any member of the original founders
of the organization. If the new leader does not have a substantial ownership position in
the organization, they would be considered an outsider agent CEO and would fall under
the definitions used by agency theory.
Insider versus Outsider: During the process of succession there are there are two
areas that need clarification as to what is considered an insider versus an outsider. The
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first of which is the succession candidate. Insider succession candidates are individuals
who have an existing relationship with the organization such that they are intimately
known to the organization or have detailed insider knowledge of the organization before
the succession process starts. Family members of a family run business would be
considered insiders. The second area for clarification concerns the individuals who are
involved in the decision making process for the succession. For larger organizations that
have boards of directors, an outside director would be a person who is not appointed by
the founder nor are they employed by the organization in any way. In many cases outside
directors are brought onto the board by venture capital investors.
Succession: The process by which the head of a company transfers management
control to another individual. Rubenson and Gupta (1996) defined succession as “The
initial succession is defined as a contingent process that leads to the founder giving up
control, whether to another family member or to ‘professional’ managers” (p. 21).
Importance of the Research
Understanding the succession process in small-sized organizations is important
for three reasons. First, a substantial amount of the gross domestic product for the United
States is produced from family run businesses (Sardeshmukh, 2007). If a business ends in
bankruptcy and then decides to liquidate the firm under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy law,
the resulting fire sale of assets can substantially reduce the value of assets (Bris, Welch,
& Ning, 2006). The employees are now unemployed and the business is no longer buying
from other businesses.
Second, the failure rate of passing a business from the founder to the next
generation is rather high. Only 3 out of 10 family owned businesses are successfully
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transferred to the second generation, the third transition is even worse (Weaver, 2008).
When a public company fails, public records are available, which may be used by
scholars, to determine the cause of the company’s failure. When a business fails that is
not publicly owned, as is the case in 8 out of 10 businesses in the United States
(Sardeshmukh, 2007), the data about the business is lost to researchers. This means that
70% of the data concerning succession is inaccessible.
Third, the national average lifespan for a business is approximately 24 years. This
coincidently is also the approximate time that a founder runs a business (Beckhard &
Dyer, 1983). The majority of founder succession research is done with large public
companies that have already proven their ability to process the event. In many studies, the
research examines a company that has repeatedly gone through a succession. This study
aims to contribute to the knowledge of what happens in the smaller business succession
events to lengthen the life span of the small sized businesses.
Limitations of the Research
The original study and resulting contingency model proposed by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) was based on research conducted on Fortune 1000 businesses. As was
previously noted the overwhelming number of businesses in the United States are smaller
in size and usually family owned. There is extensive research for succession of large
organizations but not smaller ones. This research project was limited to organizations that
have 200 employees or less and that have had a founder transition in the past 5 years. All
of the firms in this sample population were privately held organizations; and therefore
were free from the normal SEC rules and regulations regarding corporate officer
transitions. Thus, the behavior of the founders of much smaller firms was different from
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those in highly public firms. Additionally, the new target population is far larger than the
original study by Rubenson and Gupta (1996). Issues concerning sampling size and
sampling methods could introduce bias into the results. These biases might reduce the
applicability of this research to large organizations.
Summary
The succession process as it has been previously studied has mostly dealt with the
transition from one professional manager to another professional manager (Wasserman,
2003). In CEO-founder transitions there are different dynamics that affect the pace and
outcomes of the transition process (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996). When a business that is
not publicly owned goes through a founder transition the information about the transition
is lost to researcher if the business then fails. Due to the high-risk nature of most IPO
companies, the resulting economic losses, and the personal sacrifices of the people
involved in the business, a better understanding of the processes involved is highly
desirable. The objective of this research was to is to test the explanatory power of the
Contingency Model of the Initial Succession by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) for a new
target population so as to better understand the forces at work in these kinds of transitions
and to hopefully provide a framework for future organizations to use in their succession
planning.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The purpose of this chapter is to review the current research literature on
succession. The first section of this chapter will deal with the most commonly researched
succession process, the hand off from one CEO to the next. The second section will then
deal with the lesser-researched succession of organizational founder. Due to the large
amount of succession research that has been conducted over the last 50 years and the
dearth of founder studies , this review will just touch upon some of the areas of
succession that have been studied.
General Succession Research
In 1994, Kesner and Sebora published a literature review of three decades, 19701990, of research studies. The review indicated a large increase (250%) in the number of
published articles on succession. The authors felt this held both good and bad promise.
The good news is that more interest would likely bring about more structure and
precision to this area of research. Unfortunately due to the uncoordinated efforts of the
research, conflicting results were being produced. Kesner and Sebora grouped the various
studies into 11 areas of concentration:
Studies on the origin of successors.
How the size of an organization affected the rate of succession.
How the rate of succession affected the post-succession performance of
the
organization.
The various contingencies in order for succession to take place.
The characteristics of successors.
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The succession process and how it is moderated by the board of directors.
Studies dealing with how the market reacts to succession.
How organizations plan for the succession process.
Studies on the process of succession itself
What the consequences are of the succession process.
Matching successors to the needs of the organization.
As a follow on article, Giambatista, Rowe, and Riaz (2005) published another
literature review that concentrated on the next 15 years of research. Giambatista et al.
(2005) organized their literature into two major areas: research on antecedents and
consequences. The sub-areas for antecedents were:
How the board of directors affected the succession process.
How pre-succession organizational performance affected the succession
process.
The characteristics of the leader who is being replaced.
The characteristics of the organization prior to succession.
Studies on the relevant variables regarding succession.
How both environmental factors as well as industry trends affect the
succession process.
As for the research on the consequences of succession, Giambatista et al. (2005)
described the areas of research as focusing on the performance of sports teams, how
succession affected business from both an accounting point of view as well as how the
financial markets reacted to succession, and the affect succession had on both
organizational strategy and organizational restructuring.
12

When Kesner and Sebora (1994) published their literature review, they concluded
that there was at least three different perspectives in succession research: sociology,
organizational behavior, and strategic. For the sociologists, the main concern was the
transfer of power and the process of change. The organizational behaviorists focus on
successions various stages, how individuals reacted to the stress of the process, and ways
to manage the succession process. The last and largest body of research is from the
strategy based researchers who analyzed succession from a market competitiveness
perspective. It is because of the three different research perspectives and methodologies
that Kesner and Sebora (1994) believed much of the conflicting research results are due.
Fancher (2007) asserted that the strategist portion of the succession literature,
which has been primarily focused on publicly held corporations, uses archival data and
quantitative methods in an attempt to link business practices with stock holder value and
company profits. Fancher (2007) provided further detail by segmenting the research by
organizational strategy, firm performance, organizational size, industry standards and
regulatory changes, and CEO characteristics and demographics.
As an organization moves through the various stages of its life cycle, it changes in
size and formality. Some researchers have suggested that as an organization increases in
size, the more likely it is to engage in formal succession planning due to the availability
of both internal candidates and increased resources (Sharma, Chrisman, and Chua, 2003;
Shen & Cannella, 2002; Wasserman, 2003).
Firm performance, either as an antecedent (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) or as a
consequence, has often been tied to the succession process (Boyer & Ortiz-Molina, 2008;
Fancher, 2007; Fanegan, 2010). Just as in other research on succession, there have been
13

conflicting results on whether a firm will perform better (Tian, 2008) or worse
(Bennedsen et al., 2007; Weaver, 2008) after a succession (Grossman, 2007). The choice
between an insider and an outsider successor has also produced mixed performance
results (Behn, Dawley, Riley, & Yan, 2006; Shen & Cannelia, 2002).
Kesner and Sebora (1994) felt that a CEO's turnover was inherently different from
transitions at lower levels due the impact and symbolism it has on the organization. Due
to the high profile nature of the succession event, it can trigger other events both inside
and outside of the organization such as lowering or raising of the stock price, additional
executive departures, or major shifts in strategic direction.
The first major systematic contributor to the research field of succession was
Grusky (1959) who identified key variables in the process and actually tested the
proposed hypotheses within his models. The work of Grusky and others during the 1960s
was grouped into four categories by Kesner and Sebora (1994): successor origin, how
organizational size impacted frequency, how frequency of succession affects firm
performance, and the contingencies needed for succession to happen.
Successor Origins
It was the work of Carlson (1961) and Grusky (1964) that first pointed out the
importance of successor origin and yet their studies came to opposing conclusions on
organizational performance after the succession. Grusky's (1964) study on professional
baseball teams found that choosing an organizational insider resulted in improved
performance and that choosing an outsider resulted in little to no change in performance
when the previous team manager was fired due to a poor win/loss record. Carlson's
(1961) study of school superintendents indicated the reverse of Grusky's study. For
14

Carlson's 1961 study, an outside superintendent made more changes, had higher salaries,
and achieved a greater level of status than insiders did. Kesner and Sebora (1994)
attributed the differences in the results of Grusky (1964) and Carlson (1961) studies to
the differences in both research methodologies and the dependent variables used in the
studies. What Kesner and Sebora (1994) deemed to be more important was that Grusky
and Carlson were the first to study the connection between succession and its affect on
the organization.
During the 1970s, two new authors, Helmich with 13 articles and Pfeffier with 6
articles, concentrated on successor origin and succession frequency as their main research
areas. Once again, the focus of successor origin seemed to be centered on insider versus
outsider. The earlier groundwork that Carlson (1961) and Grusky (1964) had laid for both
the definitions of an insider and an outsider was challenged by Birnbaum (1971) with his
study on university presidents. For Birnbaum (1971), what was once considered an
outside successor was really an insider if the successor had contextual or industry
familiarity. If a successor was already trained in the processes and the culture of a similar
institution, then even though they were technically not associated with the university they
experienced less conflict and greater stability than those lacking the familiarity.
Helmich had five different studies in insider succession in the 1970s. His first in
1972 (Helmich & Brown, 1972) revealed that insider succession was positively
associated with a lower rate of change after succession. In 1974, Helmich published two
studies: one which showed an inverse relationship between organizational growth and
insider succession (Helmich, 1974a) and another that indicated that successor origin was
not dependent on either the predecessors tenure or firm performance (Helmich 1974b).
15

Helmich again published two studies in 1975. His first, Helmich (1975a) agreed with
Carlson's (1961) study that inside successors were positively associated with lower rates
of post-succession change. Helmich's (1975b) second study showed two positive
relationships, the first was between an inside successor’s tenure and the age of the
organization, while the second was between age of the organization and percentage of
insider successions.
In 1979, Allen, Panian, and Lotz published a study involving all major league
baseball teams between 1920 and 1973. The authors’ conclusions confirmed Grusky's
(1964) result that outside successors were inversely related to higher post succession
performance. Daum's (1975) study showed that a group was more likely to be dissatisfied
with a new leader if they were promoted from within their group.
Outsider versus insider successor performance was studied again in 2010 but was
limited this time to Fortune 500 companies (Fanegan, 2010). Examining the financial
returns for these large companies who had a succession event between 2003 and 2005,
Fanegan (2010) found no difference between the ability of an outsider CEO versus an
insider CEO to influence post-succession financial outcomes.
According to Boyer and Ortiz-Molina (2008), the level of ownership that a CEO
possesses has an effect on whether the successor will be an insider or an outsider. The
authors reported that lower levels of ownership by the CEO increase the likelihood that
an outsider will be appointed as the successor. Boyer and Ortiz-Molina (2008) also found
that non-appointed managers were more likely to divest their ownership after succession
as a precursor to departing the firm.

16

Firm Size and Succession Rate
During the early work of succession research, it was confirmed that the larger the
size of the organization the higher the rate of successions (Grusky, 1961, 1964; Perrucci
& Mannweiler, 1968; Trow 1961). In contrast to these findings, Gordon and Becker
(1964) found that if gross sales or number of employees is used as the operational
definition of size then no significant relationship is found between size and the rate of
succession. Although there is general agreement on the positive relationship between size
and the rate of succession, Kesner and Sebora (1994) attributed the differing results to the
operational definitions used by the researchers.
When it comes to outside succession there is a much higher agreement among the
researchers. Lauterbach, Vu, and Weisberg (1999) found that smaller firms have a
smaller pool of resources to draw upon and therefore would have fewer outside
successors than larger firms who would have additional resources to draw outside talent
with. In another study about top management team replacements during turnarounds
Barker, Patterson, and Mueller (2001) came to the same conclusion.
In a study by Rubenson and Gupta (1996), the authors argued that by remaining
small, an entrepreneurial founder would be able to maximize their tenure without having
to adapt to new organizational demands. Greiner (1972) indicated that by not adapting, an
entrepreneur would someday face a leadership crisis that may precipitate the need for
succession.
Smaller firm size does seem to be positively associated with choosing a family
member as the successor rather than someone who is unrelated to the CEO (Bennedsen et
al., 2007). One of the unfortunate findings for smaller firms is that data suggests that due
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to their size and concentration of ownership, power struggles appear to be more frequent
during the succession process (Shen & Cannella, 2002).
Davila (2005) told us that for young organizations, one of the key development
areas for overcoming the tension that is created by organizational growth is the adoption
of management control systems. Typically, a founder is accustomed to managing a firm
with personal controls and that formal management systems are deemed as unnecessary
do the small size of the organization. Therefore, as long as the organization stays small,
the number of personal interactions required on a daily is also small. Due to the growth of
the organization, the number of personal interactions that are required to perform their
daily activities increases to the point that formal management systems are required.
There also seems to be outside pressure from venture capitalist to introduce
professional management practices to insure the continued growth of the organization.
Venture capitalists provide more than just financial assistance, due to their relationships
with other firms that are experiencing growth they can also bring management resources
and knowledge to bear as a protective measure for their investment (Davila, 2005). The
founder might need to be replaced if they are unable or unwilling to establish the formal
systems that are require to maintain organizational growth.
Precursors to Succession
In an attempt to discover and quantify the events leading up to a succession
researchers have studied many variables to see how they contribute to the process. There
have been studies that focus on the extent to which the composition of the board of
directors affects succession as well as how the organization is performing or the

18

organizational culture. There have been studies that look at strategic reorientation,
industry turbulence, and environmental factors as precursors.
Board of directors. Fancher (2007) offered, “A promising, and more recent,
trend is the increase of interest in the role of the board to ensure ethical leadership
considerations in the development and selection of the CEO“ (p. 24). In a 2006 study by
Borokhovich et al. about how important the quality of the board of directors was in the
event of a CEO’s sudden death, it was discovered that having an independent board was
very important if there was an heir apparent. The authors found that even though a firm
might have an independent board of directors, the board was often reticent to take action
with a poorly performing CEO but would instead use the death of the CEO as an
opportunity to make improvements in the management (Borokhovich et al., 2006).
The composition of the governing board of directors for an organization can have
a significant effect on the succession process (Borokhovich et al., 2006). The board of
directors can be characterized as either strong or weak as compared to the political
strength of the founder, they can be either participative or non-participative, the number
of directors can be either small or large, and the board can be composed entirely of
insiders or they can be a large number of outsiders on the board. Each of these variations
and combinations has been studied at one point to understand how they affect succession.
In recent years the role of the board of directors has become much more
participative in nature (Kerr & Werther, 2008). For the purposes of this paper, a
participative board shares leadership with inside directors, outside directors, and
management. There are active discussions, debates, and disagreements. This recent trend
towards more participative boards has been seen as a reaction to more vocal stockholders
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who are much more likely to hold the board responsible for financial results (Kerr
& Werther, 2008). In previous years it was more common to have a board of directors
that would be characterized as either weak or non-participative, one that was reluctant to
intervene in the case of a poorly performing CEO due to their allegiance to the CEO that
was active in their election as members to the board (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Nelson,
2003).
Baker and Gompers (2003) found that when a firm was financed by venture
capital the composition of the board of directors was more likely to contain both inside
and outside board members. As was mentioned earlier, the CEO’s power and tenure
could be characterized as a negotiation between the CEO and the outside board members
(Baker & Gompers, 2003). When the reputation of the venture capital is considered high,
the power of the incumbent CEO was shown to be low since the venture capital firm was
seen as having the ability to replace the founder (Baker & Gompers, 2003). In an earlier
research paper on the power and politics of CEO succession by Ocasio (1994), the author
found that during periods of poor economic times there was a higher rate of succession
by insider board members as they were seen as more competent alternatives to outside
successors.
Bommer and Ellstrand (1996) postulated that the inconclusive nature of the
previous studies on CEO succession was primarily caused by limitations in sampling
data. In the authors’ own study of how CEO successor type effected the antecedents and
consequences in 219 succession events, they found that if the age of the exiting CEO was
younger than an expected retirement age then there was a inverse relationship between
the number of insider board members and the likelihood of an outside successor.
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Contrary to other researchers, Bommer and Ellstrand did not find a relationship between
equity ownership and succession origin.
As a public response to unacceptable firm performance, the board of directors will often
fire the incumbent CEO (Bommer & Ellstrand, 1996; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). It is
during the process of choosing a successor that the board of directors is their most active
(Zald, 1969).
How variations in board size affected replacements of the corporate presidency was
studied by Helmich in 1980. Helmich’s study involved reviewing data from 54 industrial
corporations over a 30-year period from 1947 to 1977. He found that there was an overall
positive correlation between volatility in board size and succession rate of the presidency.
Digging deeper, Helmich found that successful companies had a significantly inverse
relationship between board size volatility and succession and a strong positive relation
when the companies were unsuccessful.
In 1988, Weisbach conducted a research study with 367 U.S. publicly traded
companies. The study probed the relationship between outsider controlled boards and
CEO turnover due to poor performance. The results of the study indicated a strong
negative relationship between the number of outside directors and the firm’s financial
performance as measured by stock returns and earnings changes. Weisbach’s (1988)
results were in line with the view that a company’s stock value can be increased by
replacing bad management.
When the same issue of how the number outside directors influenced the
replacement of the CEO was examined in 270 Japanese publicly traded companies, Kang
and Shivdasani (1995) found no relationship to CEO turnover. Digging deeper, the
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authors found that non-routine CEO turnover was related to negative operating income,
return on assets, and stock returns once the financial information was adjusted to industry
expected norms. Additionally, the authors found that outsider succession was more likely
if the firm had a large shareholder and had ties to a major bank.
Perry and Shivdasani (2005) studied the effect that boards of directors have on the
performance of a firm during a restructuring effort. The results of studying 94 firms
indicated that firms with a majority of outside directors were more likely to initiate a
forced CEO turnover than firms with a majority of insider directors. Additionally, outside
dominated firms were much more likely to initiate asset-restructuring, layoffs, and
undertake cost cutting measures than to disciple the CEO by removal (Perry &
Shivdasani, 2005). The authors felt that this might be explained as a last resort by the
board.
Organizational performance. When it comes to organization performance as an
antecedent for succession, one would think that there would be universal acceptance. Yet,
again there are conflicting research results as the primary reason and conditions for
replacing the leader of an organization. When researchers have concentrated on sports
team, there seems to be agreement that a decrease in organizational performance is
positively associated with initiating succession for the team manager (Warner, Watts, &
Wruck, 1988). This inverse relationship was also found by Eitzen and Yetman (1972) in
their study of 129 college baseball teams and also by Allen et al.’s 1979 study of baseball
teams.
In an attempt to understand the inconsistent results of previous research studies on
corporate performance and CEO turnover, Puffer and Weintrop (1991) investigated how
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performance expectations by the board of directors affected CEO succession. The authors
argued that it was the expectations of the board that was the dominating factor in CEO
turnovers. After reviewing 408 CEO turnovers that happened before retirement age and
using stock market analyst’s predictions as a surrogate for board expectations, it was
found that when the expected earnings per share fell below expectations, a CEO turnover
was a likely event.
In 2002, Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos reviewed the affect of the issuance of a
U.K Code of Best Practice on the rate of CEO succession for underperforming firms. In
the code it was recommended that at least three members of the board be outside
directors and that the CEO should not also hold the office of chairman of the board.
Although skeptical that the code would have an effect on CEO turnover the authors were
surprised to see an increase in CEO turnovers for underperforming firms. The authors did
offer a warning in that they did not see a strong relationship between turnovers and
improved corporate performance.
Using publicly listed Chinese corporations from 1998 to 2002, Kato and Long
(2006) found a statistically significant yet modest inverse relationship between CEO
succession and firm performance. Further analysis disclosed that the relationship
weakened if the firm was still under the control of the Chinese state. When the number of
outside directors rises for these firms, the inverse link between performance and
succession grows stronger.
In a 2006 study concerning the succession of busy outside directors, it was found
that firms experience increased stock price after the director’s departure (Fich &
Shivdasani, 2006). The researchers found that boards where the directors hold two or
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more directorships with other boards were shown to have weaker profitability, lower
book ratios, and a deceased likelihood of CEO succession with respect to firm
performance. CEO turnover tied to firm performance in outsider-dominated boards with
busy directors were indistinguishable from insider-dominated boards. The authors
concluded that busy directors are associated with lower levels of corporate governance
and hence lower levels of CEO succession.
Industry and Environmental Factors
CEO succession specific to the health care industry was studied by Wilson and
Stranahan in 2000. The authors chose to use a multivariate quantitative methodology to
discover which environmental factors were correlated to the succession of hospital CEOs.
Using data from 846 U.S. hospitals that had a change in the CEO, the researchers found,
in general, (a) smaller hospitals tend to have higher rates of CEO turnover than larger
hospitals and (b) hospitals that offered more services also tended to have higher
succession rates. After adjusting for factors such as the number of beds it was found that
the higher rate of patients per type of service offered was also positively related to higher
succession rates. The authors postulated that an increased breadth of services as well as
the increased number of patients per service could be proxies for job complexity and thus
was the underlying link with CEO succession (Wilson & Stranahan, 2000).
In a 2000 study about strategy reorientation as it relates to industry turbulence,
Gordon, Stewart, Sweo, and Luker examined companies from both stable industries as
well as from turbulent industries. The results from examining furniture and computer
companies from 1987 to 1993 indicated that both CEO turnover and industry turbulence
were positively associated precursors with changing the strategic direction of a company.
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Surprisingly, the authors found that replacing the top management team was inversely
related to reorientation of the company’s strategic goals.
The issue of how environmental factors affect the rate of CEO succession was
studied by Forbes, Manrakhan, and Banerjee in 2004. The researchers proposed three
hypotheses concerning the rate of CEO turnover during periods of industry turbulence:
(a) founders would experience lower turnover rates than non-founder CEOs, (b) CEOs
with previous CEO experience would be protected from replacement., and (c) a CEO
who was also the COB would also experience a lower rate of succession. One hundred
twenty-seven Internet related companies were studied during the 2000 Internet crash. The
results of their research bore out all three hypotheses. In general, poorly performing
companies were more likely to replace the CEO during economic hardships. Being the
founder, holder the role of CEO and COB, or having previous CEO experience was
positively associated with lower rates of CEO turnover (Forbes et al., 2004).
Contingencies for Succession Success
As an indicator for post succession performance Kell and Carrott (2005)
investigated how the culture of the organization influences the leadership style of a
successor during a merger. The process of changing the culture of an organization during
a leadership change can be monumental (Kell & Carrott, 2005). The authors found that if
the two organizations had similar cultures, the process of merger and succession went
smoothly; however, if the cultures were different, the process of consolidation and
succession had a detrimental effect on the firm.
Zald (1965) found that the process of succession was a political one, a struggle for power
between the board members and the chief executive. The ability of the successor to
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balance the competing claims for corporate resources and strategic direction is directly
related to their post succession success.
Succession Planning
When researchers have investigated how organizations are planning for the
process of succession they find that very few organizations actual do any planning at all
(Brown & Coverley, 1999). Brown and Coverley (1999), in their study of family
businesses found a positive correlation between the age of the incumbent CEO and the
instigation of the planning process. Additionally, the authors found that CEOs in service
related firms made no succession plans due to their belief that they, the CEO, were
essential to the firms continued success.
Brady, Fulmer, and Helmich (1982) examined the expected tenure from the
CEO’s point of view. After reviewing the data from approximately 1,500 questionnaires,
the authors concluded that only 50% of respondents engaged in any succession planning.
Of those organizations that do have a succession plan, the board of directors actively
directs the process only 18% of the time; the other 82% of the time the incumbent CEO
drives the planning process. When a succession plan is in place there was little to no
difference in the reported tenures between insider and outsider CEOs (Brady et al., 1982).
In a large-scale study by Naveen (2006) about how the CEO succession process is
affected by human capital considerations, the author found that operational complexity
was inversely related to outsider succession. The more complex a firm was, the greater
the expense was needed to train an outside successor and thus the positive relationship
between complexity and the planning for and grooming of an insider for succession.
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Additionally the author found that succession planning for these complex organizations
was positively related to voluntary successions.
In a study of 118 presidents or family firms, Sharma et al. (2003) evaluated how
the process of planning for succession was influenced by three factors: the commitment
of the presidents family to the business, the predisposition of a trusted successor to assert
themselves, and the desire by the incumbent to have the business stay in the family. The
results of the research revealed that a trusted successor could significantly impact the
succession planning process. In such cases the authors conclude that a trusted successor
rather than the incumbent may be driving the process, which can have negative
implications for the family firm.
According to Tung-Chun (1999), traditional Chinese businesses are known for
their informal organizational structure, emphasis on trusted personal relationships known
as guanxi, top down management decision making, and lack of a formal succession plan.
In an attempt to assess the acceptance of formal succession planning in rapidly growing
firms, 166 Taiwanese companies were surveyed as to the extent of formal succession
plans and also as to the reasons that might deter formal planning. The results indicated
that 65% of the respondent companies had formal plans as contrasted to a recent study of
U.S. firms that indicated a 93% adoption (Tung-Chun, 1999). Of the 166 firms,
approximately 63% were Taiwanese owned with the remainder being American or
Japanese owned. The number one reason that was cited by those firms not having a
formal succession plan was that a plan would negatively affect the business. Tung-Chun
expressed that this was most likely a result of the way that Taiwanese owners had based
their businesses on personal relationships (guanxi). Once a Taiwanese firm had achieved
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a size of 1,000 or more employees, they were 50% more likely to have a succession plan
than those firms with less than 300 employees. This positive relationship between firm
size and succession planning was explained by the author as being a result of smaller
firms not wanting to introduce disharmony between co-workers when one is groomed for
a higher position.
Consequences of Succession (Non-market Related)
Succession events can have profound effects on the remaining employees: their
productivity, their willingness to follow the new leaders, and for some a sense of loss
from the change event. With the founder establishing the social norms for the
organization and imbuing it with its sense of culture, the succession of founder can seem
as though the organization is undergoing dramatic change.
Despite 40 years of research there is still no clear indicator of whether or not
employees will see either a drop or an increase in their productivity after a succession
(Ballinger & Schoorman, 2007). Ballinger and Schoorman (2007) believed this is
because researchers have not taken into account how political the succession was, what
level of expertise the successor has, whether the new leader was in insider or an outsider,
the timing in relationship to internal projects, and to what extent the new leader might
change the management team. With so many variables in play during a succession, the
productivity of any one employee might be very different from another employee.
One of the big factors for a successor is willingness of the organization to follow
the new leader. Byrne (1998) did a research study investigating the relationship between
organizational commitment, employee’s perceptions of competence, and leadership style
in small businesses. The author found that higher organizational commitment was
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positively correlated with higher perceived credibility of the successor. Taking time
before and during the succession process to establish credibility will help to maintain if
not improve organizational commitment (Byrne, 1998). Additionally, the author found
that the more that a successor understood and was knowledgeable in their business, the
higher the level of employee commitment to the organization.
Organizational identity is defined by the founder. Their departure can be of great
concern to the employees that are left behind. In a study by Balser and Carmin (2009),
succession is examined from the employee’s point of view concerning the organization’s
identity. The authors found that succession can uncover undisclosed disagreements about
the organization’s mission and identity. Conflicts over identity can lead to considerable
disruption to the organization’s activities and successors need to pay attention to the
shared values and views of that identity.
In a 2007 study on intra-industry succession, Grossman found that hiring
executives who had spent a large amount of their career working for a rival firm in the
same industry were more likely to make significant organizational changes sooner than
executives from outside of the industry. Senior executives often acquire tacit industry
knowledge that allows them to respond quicker than executives from other industries. A
warning that Grossman (2007) gave was that using succession as a competitive advantage
tool to obtain tacit information can lead to similar company strategies. One benefit from
using succession as a way to gain access to the knowledge of a rival is that the successor
will be able to come into the firm with high levels of legitimacy and power (Grossman,
2007).
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Miller (1993) reported in his study of 36 mostly large US companies that
succession is linked to a wide variety of changes in an organization. Apparently new
CEO’s were more likely (a) to process more information than their predecessors when the
organization had been experiencing poor performance and (b) to distribute authority
(Miller, 1993). It was the multidimensional changes by the successors that the author
attributed to what he felt were breaks in the momentum of the organization. If the
previous strategies were adaptive and congruent to current environment, Miller (1993)
felt that the changes might do more harm than good.
Another study surrounding the succession event was one that considered how
much discretion the incoming CEO had over changes in various financial variables
(Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993). The authors found that incoming CEOs of poorly
performing firms had greater discretion and found no evidence of managerial discretion
when the outgoing CEOs firm was performing strongly.
In a study that reexamined the data from a previous research study, Gordon et al.
(2000) sought to understand how a firm’s strategy was affected by industry turbulence.
The sample population was from two very different industries: 75 firms from the very
turbulent computer software industry and 45 firms from the very stable furniture industry
for a total of 120 firms. Using improved statistical analysis the authors concluded that
strategic re-orientation was positively associated with CEO turnover and industry
turbulence. These results were in contrast to the previous study by Lant, Miliken, and
Batra (1992) who proposed that strategic re-orientation was positively associated with
awareness of environmental changes, previous poor financial performance, and top
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management team heterogeneity. In fact, the new authors indicated that strategic
reorientation was negatively related to top management turnover.
In another study on how strategy relates to CEO turnover, Casamatta and
Guembel (2010) explored how the legacy of the firm’s strategy can determine strategic
change, turnover, and CEO compensation. Their results indicated that a board may allow
a CEO to be entrenched due three factors; the expense of replacing the incumbent, a
desire to continue the current corporate strategy, and that the continued firm performance
can only be partially attributed to a successor. If, however, the board of directors has
deemed that a change in corporate strategy is warranted, Casamatta and Guembel (2010)
asserted that their findings indicated that replacing the CEO was pivotal to ensuring the
new strategy took hold. The authors argued that an entrenched incumbent CEO would
have a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail.
Sport Team Performance
Succession studies of athletic teams are particularly attractive as performance is
easily gauged by wins and losses. Professional sports by definition are publicly
documented and are numerically tracked on many levels so as to make analysis much
easier than private equity firms.
Gamson and Scotch (1964) conducted a study on baseball team and found that their
measurement of the rate of successions of baseball team managers did not adversely
affect post succession performance. Trow’s (1961) study showed the same results but did
find that if the rate of succession varied then there was an inverse relationship. Grusky in
1963 performed additional research on baseball team managers and the variability
succession rate; Grusky’s conclusions were similar to Trow’s (1961).
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Using data from the National Hockey League that spanned 60 years, Glenn
Rowea, Cannella, Rankin, and Gorman (2005) confirmed previous studies that indicated
that changing the general manager of a hockey team in mid season, what the authors
termed as a ritual scapegoating, will result in a decrease in team performance. Glenn
Rowea et al. argued that it takes time for a manager to take charge of a team and that the
optimal time for a manager succession to take place is between seasons. The authors also
noted an increased level of performance was obtained after the new general manager and
the team undergo a playoff together. Little if any performance gains achieved during the
first season together were to be expected as the new manager and team define a working
relationship.
Although the effects of management change for a sport team has been studied
many times, Wagner (2010) decided to see how environmental changes moderated the
effects of the succession. Using data from a national German soccer league that spanned
39 seasons, 48 teams, and 281 different managers, Wagner sought to understand how
changing one of the major rules of the game would affect team management turnover. In
1995, winning soccer teams were awarded three points for a win versus the previous two
in league standings. As a result, there was increased pressure for a soccer coach and team
to perform as the value of a win versus a tie or loss now had increased value. The author
found that after the introduction of three-point rule in the period of 1995 to 2003, there
was a significantly higher level of coach turnovers as compared to the two-point era of
1963 to 1994. Given the high pay off for a win, Wagner felt this was sufficient to explain
the higher average scores in the 1995-2003 seasons versus the 1963 to 1995 seasons.
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Business Performance
As Grusky pointed out in his 1960 study on succession, succession is a very
disruptive event in the life of an organization. What is often on the minds of those
involved in the succession is how a company will perform under the new leadership.
Weisbach (1995) studied the consequences of succession in 172 firms between
1971 and 1982 as that related to poorly performing divisions within a company. The
results of the study indicated a positive relationship between management turnover and
the divestiture of a division that the press considered to be performing poorly. The author
believed his research coincided with prior agency theory studies where it was postulated
that turnovers were important public events in the life of a corporation. Agency theory
suggests that management successions can lead to the reversal of previous poor decisions
(Weisbach, 1995).
Shen and Cannelia (2002) found in their study involving 228 firms that had
recently undergone a CEO succession that many factors affected the successor’s
performance. In particular, their study indicated a positive relationship between senior
management turnover with a contentious successor and improved financial performance,
as measured by return on assets (Shen & Cannelia, 2002).
Succession can have either a positive or a negative effect on the stock price of a
public company. In the case of the founder’s death where there is no apparent successor
and the firm is performing poorly, having an independent board has been shown to have a
positive effect on stock price (Borokhovich et al., 2006).
In an earlier study by Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996), the authors
showed that shareholders benefited from succession announcements when an outsider
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was appointed to the CEO position. However, the authors also found that the
shareholders suffered when the replacement CEO was an insider after the previous CEO
was fired.
In an attempt to understand the equivocal results of previous research studies on
board composition and firm performance, Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, and Donahue
(2007) examined stock market reaction to the deaths of 73 CEOs. Their research
indicated that a CEO’s power as measured by the percentage of equity owned and the
CEO’s position as COB mitigated the strength of the board of directors. The demise of a
powerful CEO was often greeted with relief when the board of directors was not
independent enough to keep the CEO from making self serving decisions or when an
outside dominated board controlled the actions of a weak CEO (Combs et al., 2007).
Stock prices increased after the announcements of the deaths of powerful CEOs with
insider dominated boards and also fell when a powerful CEO died who had served with
an outsider dominated board.
Stock market reactions were used as a measurement of firm benefit from the
firing of key executives in publicly traded companies by Worrell, Davidson, and
Glascock (1993). The researchers examined the reactions of investors to the turnover
announcements from 1963 to 1987 and found a positive association between stock market
valuations and the succession announcements. Additionally, the positive market reaction
happened immediately for outsider successions while investors took a more wait and see
attitude for insider successions.
Looking into 367 executive announcements during 1986 in Fortune 500 firms, Davidson,
Worrell, and Cheng (1990) studied the effect to those announcements in terms of stock
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market reactions. The authors found that overall the market reacted in a strong positive
manner to the announcements. Differences were found however in the successors’ origin,
age at the time of appointment, and their previous position within the firm. According to
the authors, revealing the conditions under which the appointment was made is very
important in terms of stock market reaction.
In another study on the effects of stocker holder wealth in large firms when CEO
succession occurs during bankruptcy, Davidson, Worrell, and Dutia (1993) found
positive abnormal returns associated with the announcements. In particular, the
announcement of an outsider succession candidate was more favorably responded to by
higher stock value than for candidates that were considered insiders. The researchers also
found that outsider CEOs were more likely to be appointed around bankruptcy events
than insiders under normal succession.
Frequency of Succession
Greiner, Cummings, and Bhambri (2003) offered that the rate of CEO successions
has risen steadily over recent years. By 2003, the average tenure of a Fortune 500 CEO
had drop to 7.5 years from 9.5 years in 1995 (Greiner et al., 2003). Citing earlier
research, the authors indicated that new CEO were often under immediate pressure by the
board of directors to produce improved financial results by making major organizational
changes. The vast majority of these new CEOs are rarely successful and thus repeat the
cycle of CEO turnover.
In a study published in 1997, Lauterbach and Weisberg compared the
appointments of 418 CEOs in US companies from 1978-1979 to 1989-1991. The authors
found that over time the frequency of external or outsider successions had increased due
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to the external pressures during the 1980s from hostile takeovers and corporate raiders.
They speculated that these pressures increased the likelihood of a board of directors
taking bold steps such as seeking and outsider for the CEO position to save an
underperforming firm. In their research paper Lauterbach and Weisberg (1997) proposed
that firms with poor past performance, are smaller in size, and with more vacant top
positions will more frequently appoint an outsider to the CEO position than an insider.
Contrary to other studies, Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) found that even
though the frequency of forced CEO turnover and outsider CEO succession had both
increased, their results did not indicate an increased sensitivity by the board of directors
to firm performance as the reason for the turnovers. The authors examined 24 years of
financial data extracted from the Forbes annual compensation surveys from 1971 to 1994.
During this time, 946 successions involving 486 were examined for changes in internal
governance mechanisms. What was revealed in the data was a significant positive
relationship between the number of outside board members, the percentage of stock
ownership by directors or officers other than the CEO, and the likelihood of an outsider
succession accompanied by a forced CEO turnover (Huson et al., 2001).
In the 1996 study by Borokhovich et al. on outsider CEO frequency, a strong
monotonic relationship was discovered between outsider succession and the percentage
of outside directors. Using data from 969 successions occurring between 1970 and 1988
at 588 large public firms, the authors found that when a CEO is forced it is four times
more likely that the successor will be from an outside firm
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Matching Successors to Organizational Needs
A successor’s organizational strategic fit, demographics, leadership
characteristics, and industry experience have also been the subject of many research
studies (Fancher, 2007; Giambatista et al., 2005; Shen & Cannelia, 2002; Tian, 2008).
Shen and Cannelia (2002) wrote that an outsider CEO has a greater chance of dismissal
after disappointing financial returns due to their power base and social networks within a
firm. Phan and Lee (1995) discovered that CEO’s who had having personal prestige and
who also occupied the office of Chairman had a lower probability of replacement than
being a firm insider. In a study by Ocasio and Kim (1999), the backgrounds of 275 new
CEOs were studied and the authors discovered a demographic trend away from CEOs
whose careers were dominated by financial experience towards those CEO’s that have
more operational and technical experience.
Family Succession
As of 2000, at least 8 out of 10 businesses in the United States were family owned
and 50% of the gross domestic product of the United States came from these same
business (Sardeshmukh, 2007). With only 30% of businesses successfully transitioning
from the first generation to the second and the second to the third only achieving a
success rate of 10%, the effect of failed family businesses is substantial (Weaver, 2008).
According to Kansikas and Kuhmonen (2008), the founder of a small business will often
involve their family members in its operations. When the day finally comes that the
founder decides to transition the firm to the next generation, they must make the
additional decisions as to how the transition will occur.
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In a 2006 study on inherited control and firm performance by Pérez-Gonzalez, the
author reported that firms whose successor was as a blood relative of the founder, were
related to the founder by marriage, or were a large shareholder in the firm performed at a
lower level than those successors who were not related to the founder. The author’s
conclusion was that nepotism ultimately hurts a firm’s financial performance by not
utilizing the full scope of the available labor market. In general, it was found that
underperforming firms did not have a successor CEO that had attended one of the more
selective universities.
In a research paper on the role of families in succession decisions and
performance inside the family firm, Bennedsen et al., (2007) found that family successors
underperformed as compared to nonfamily CEOs. The authors emphasized that the
underperformance was very evident when the family firm was large, had a highly skilled
labor force, or was in a fast growing industry. Another interesting result of the study was
that the family firms were more likely to pass CEO control to first child-males than firstchild females. Additionally, Bennedsen et al., (2007) confirmed the findings of Bertrand,
Johnson, Samphantharak, and Schoar (2008) in that the decision to appoint a family
member as the new CEO was influenced by the size of the family and the current CEO’s
marital history.
Founder Studies
Schein (2004) asserted that founders have a major influence on how an
organization forms its early culture. Bolman and Deal (2008) also told us that founders
could have a dramatic influence on an organization. One the most disruptive events for a
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firm is the process of succession (Grusky, 1960). Yet there is a surprisingly modest
amount of research on the succession of the founder (Wasserman, 2003).
Retirement is by far the most common motive for succession. Given that over
80% of the businesses in the United States are family owned (Sardeshmukh, 2007), the
vast majority of the succession process is involved in passing control of the family firm
to the next generation. Issues of business continuity and the transition process then
become very important. Succession planning can be an important tool for increasing both
short and long term continuity in leadership (Richards, 2009). Collins (2001) also talked
about how the great companies developed strong and deep executive teams that allowed
an organization to succeed even after the founder-genius left the company. According to
Richards (2009), “Having depth in all levels of leadership positions allows for the
continuity of business operations by offering consistency of organizational mission and
culture even during personnel transitions” (p. 1).
In 1990, Handler proposed a four-phase process for succession in family firms.
The first phase is where the founder is running the firm as the sole executive. The next
phase is entered as the founder’s role is diminished either due to health issues or in order
to make room for the next generation. In the third phase, the founder delegates more and
more responsibility to the other family members. In the last phase, the next generation
has take control of the day to day operation of the firm and the founder has either entered
retirement or acts as a consultant to the family firm.
At some point in the process the founder has to decide if the successor will be a
family member, an outside hired president, or if they will simply sell the family business.
If there will be a transfer of control to a family member then many questions arise as to
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what the best financial strategy would be to handle the transfer, a gift, an outright sale, or
annuity trust (Parrish, 2009). Given the possible tax burdens and financial strain that a
transfer can cause, proper planning is required in order to prevent a failed transfer.
Gompers (1994) explained that in 1979, an amendment was made to the
Employee Retirement and Income Act (ERISA), which allowed financial institutions that
were managing employee retirement funds to invest in new venture funding companies:
The 1979 change explicitly allowed fund managers to invest up to 10%o f
their capital in venture funds. Pension fund commitments to venture
capital rose dramatically increasing annual new contributions to venture
capital funds from $100-200 [million] during the 1970s to in excess of $4
billion by the end of the 1980s. (p. 2)
This new wave of capital was a game changer in the way that entrepreneurs
structured their firms for an initial public offering. Of particular note was the rise in the
number of high tech companies that were formed in the San Francisco area during the
1990s, which in time would be called the Dot-Com boom. A typical entrepreneur would
have an exit strategy that involved cashing out a portion of their stock once the company
passed its initial public offering and handing over control to a professional manager. In
these cases the founder succession was an integral part of the business plan for the
company from the very beginning.
Despite the foreknowledge that no one lives forever, most organizations do not
have a succession plan in place (Brown & Coverley, 1999; Carey & Ogden, 2000). As a
result, the organization is thrown into chaos when the founder unexpectedly passes away
or is incapacitated by an illness or accident. It is during these times that the quality of the
board of directors is key to survival of the organization (Behn et al., 2006). Of those
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organizations that do not have a plan in place, less than 25% survive after the death of the
founder (Bowes, 1991).
The moment that an organization is funded by someone other than the founder,
the founder immediately comes under pressure to perform financially. Operating capital
can be raised by either friends and family members of the founder or by outside
investment. The most common form of outside capital is in the form of venture capital.
Venture capitalists as a general rule are more likely to place outsiders on the board of
directors. The power structure within the organization then becomes a negotiation
between the CEO and the outside board members (Baker & Gompers, 2003).
Additionally, the founder’s tenure is also weighed against the founder’s financial
performance as CEO.
Vancil (1987) informed us that as a senior executive rises through the ranks they
develop a strong desire to become the CEO. The office of the CEO has many benefits
concerning both material rewards and privilege. If an aspiring executive wishes to
become the CEO they must prove themselves worthy of the role, either to the founder or
to the outside board members that a venture capital firm might bring in. Unfortunately
when a CEO is performing badly and is being considered for removal, the entire senior
management team is also considered for removal as well. As a result, senior executives
might find it to their benefit to challenge the company founder as a way to gain support
from the outside board members (Shen & Cannella, 2002). Even if the senior executives
are not interested in staying with their current firm but are instead looking to the external
market as their next career move, the senior executives know they will be evaluated in
part by the financial performance of their current employer. Once again this will have a
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motivating influence for the senior executives to maintain their reputations and challenge
the founder as a way to improve the organizations financial returns (Shen & Cannella,
2002).
Founders are Different From Other CEOs
Mintzberg (1973) explained that most entrepreneurs have personal characteristics
that are best suited for startup organizations where uncertainty reigns. Unfortunately
these same characteristics are not well suited for the management of large stable
organizations. The primary factor that limits the ability of an entrepreneur from
transitioning into a managerial role is the establishment of personnel control systems.
Most entrepreneurial organizations tend to be small where everyone reports to the
founder (Mintzberg, 1973). Founders have a vision for their organization and where they
want to lead it. Given that most startup organizations are small in nature, communicating
that vision so that the first employees embrace it is easily handled by the founder. With a
small span of control leadership in the form of the founders own charisma or promised
payoff for the new company is enough to embed a sense of culture into the organization
such that personnel control systems are not needed (Davila, 2005). According to
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) one of the major causes for founder succession is that the
founder was unable to grow into the role of a general manager. It is only after the
founder’s succession that the necessary control systems are finally put in place.
According to Greiner (1998), “The founders often resist stepping aside, even though they
are probably temperamentally unsuited to the job” (p. 61).
Founders also differ from their general manager successors in the amount of
ownership they control. In a “Top 500” survey done by Inc. Magazine of private firms, it
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was found that 75% of the ownership in these successful firms was personally held by
57% of the founders (Nelson, 2003). In recent research paper by Miller, Le BretonMiller, and Lester (2011), lone founder ownership was associated with entrepreneurial
growth strategies and higher shareholder returns while firms that a lead family held
shareholder majority only had average returns. The net effect is that founders who have
majority control behave differently than next generation managers.
Since there is no organizational culture until the founders declare it, they have a
profound effect on how the culture is first formed (Robins & Judge, 2008). Founders
imprint their organizations by the early decisions they make regarding the strategy, initial
structure, and culture (Nelson, 2003). What a founder pays attention to and values will
become imbedded as the core set of value for the organization (Schein, 1983). The very
act of founding is to establish behavioral norms and practices. These behaviors are then
passed on to each new employee until they start to take on a life of their own. Even the
way that a founder designs the physical workspaces can have an effect on the culture of
the organization (Schein, 1983).
For most founders, their current organization is their first attempt at
entrepreneurship. In Europe, only 18% to 30% of entrepreneurs have experience exiting
an organization and starting another one; for the United States the percentage is
approximately 12% (Plehn-Dujowich, 2010). Given the low transition numbers, it is often
only when venture capital is introduced to the organization that experience in replacing
the founder can be found. The ability of the venture capital firm to offer not only
financial resources but also the ability to offer an alternative CEO candidate to the
founder is a major factor in the venture firm’s ability to affect succession.
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Sonnenfeld (1988) proposed that a CEO often takes on a role that is something
akin to a mythic hero in the culture of the organization that they lead. For those who join
the organization after it has had some level of success, the founder is seen as the one who
blazed the trail. In stories that are told after many years and many battles have been won
the founders are often held in an elevated view (Sonnenfeld, 1988).
Why Replace the Founder
Despite many years of study, the question of whether to replace the founder at
some point has not been definitively settled. There are many authors who believe that the
founder has served their purpose once the organization achieves a particular level of
maturity (Boeker, & Wiltbank, 2005; Churchill & Lewis, 1983; DeTienne, 2010; Hofer &
Charan, 1984). While others believe that the founder should stay on as a consultant as
long as they can continue to contribute to the organization (Nelson, 2003). According to
Davila (2005), replacing the founder is a major step in moving an organization forward
from an organization that is based on personal and informal processes towards one that
has more formal processes. It is the professional manager that will seek the more formal
operating systems that a growing organization needs (Davila, 2005).
Examining the succession events in 108 firms from 1960 to 1990, Ocasio (1999)
sought to understand how a board of directors decides what the succession process will
be. After reviewing a total of 216 succession events, the author found that there is
considerable inertia for a board to follow previous succession processes. This process
inertia enabled the board’s ability to make a decision but it also restricted is decision
abilities as well. Citing strong empirical evidence Ocasio (1999) went on to say that
boards rely heavily on any formal process that already exists for the succession process.
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The study also revealed that if a formal succession process already existed then there was
a positive association with an insider succession. When there was no formal process in
place such as when the founder is replaced, then lower levels of insider succession were
observed (Ocasio, 1999).
Focusing on the biotechnology industry in 2008, Dr. Jun Li looked at 90 U.S.
companies that had completed IPOs between 1991 and 1999 in a study that examined the
amount of organizational restructuring before the IPO’s were completed. In particular,
the author studied the top management team’s tenure, the percentage of organizational
founders in the top management team, and the extent that the top management team had
functional heterogeneity. The results of the study showed an overall negative association
between all three of the variables. When the percentage of founders’ variable was
examined independently the author found a positive association with succession during
periods of high growth. Li (2008) felt that this result had confirmed Rubenson and
Gupta’s (1992) earlier research showing that a founder often does not adapt quick enough
to the new demands of a quickly growing company.
The chief executive sets the policies and procedures of an organization, they
communicate with the board of directors, and generally set the agenda for the entire
organization (Borokhovich et al., 2006). If the firm has been performing poorly of late, a
change in management can be seen as a corrective action that is being taken by the board
to move the firm in a new direction. Borokhovich et al. (2006) informed us that investors
react positively and generally benefit when a new outside CEO is appointed. Shen and
Cannella (2003) also confirmed that the hiring of an outside CEO is preferred by the
equity markets than the appointment of an insider to the CEO position.
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In a study on how top management team turnover affected an organization’s
ability to complete an IPO, Beckman, Burton, and O'Reilly (2007) reviewed the data
from 161independent private high-technology pre-IPO firms in California’s Silicon
Valley. The researchers found that having a top management team with a wide variety of
previous company associations as well as varied functional experiences positively
correlated with the likelihood of completing an IPO. Losing an experienced top
management team due to turnover was also shown to reduce the likelihood of IPO
completion. Additionally, it was found that founder exits increased the likelihood of IPO
completion.
Due to the ethical issues raised by the business scandals that have been reported in
the recent press, Leone and Liu (2010) researched the question of whether or not being
the founder of organization affected the decision to fire the CEO after accounting
irregularities were disclosed. Using data from 96 newly formed companies that had
reported accounting irregularities or fraud in their financial re-statements and a control
group of similar companies, the authors found a dramatic difference in CEO turnover rate
if the CEO was also the founder. Founders were replaced 29% of the time as compared to
49% for non-founder CEOs. Leone and Liu (2010) concluded that a founder was much
more likely to entrench themselves in the organization and to shift blame to the CFO for
the irregularities. Additionally, directors of founder led companies were less likely to
initiate an internal investigation than non-founder led companies.
Various Succession Models
The succession process can be instigated by many causes: the death or illness of
the founder, a change in the needs of the organization, financial pressures, a forced outing
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by the board of directors or a majority of the shareholders, there may be some sort of
social scandal, a legal complication, or it may be a planned succession because of
retirement. No matter how the succession process is started, it can be classified as either
voluntary or involuntary. In the case of a voluntary succession the process can be
considered a rational, might well thought out co-operative process.
Mythic heroes. Sonnenfeld (1988) told us that however subtle or explicit the selfimaged hero role might be, the leader is very often reluctant to say farewell to this role
and to retire. Two of the four styles of departure that Sonnenfeld (1988) described fall
into the voluntary category, namely the ambassador and the governor styles. While the
departure style of the general and the monarch fall into the involuntary category.
Ambassador leaders co-operate in the transition of power to the new leader, but
they also take an active role in the organization while still supporting their successor.
Ambassadors often will take a role on the board of directors but not as the chairman as
they still feel that they can contribute to the organization. Sonnenfeld’s (1988) governor
style is known for leaving their firm cleanly and effectively severing all ties to the
organization. For a governor, the heroic mission that they pursued while leading the
organization is tempered by their realization that they can experience this same heroic
status in a new organization. Thus they have a tendency to look to new opportunities and
adventures in new organizations.
It is the heroic self-image that can act as an exit barrier for the CEO to let go of
their leadership position (Sonnenfeld, 1988). Both of Sonnenfeld’s monarch and general
styles of departure fall into the involuntary category of succession. Monarch’s either die
in office or are unwillingly forced from office in an overthrow. The monarch never sees a
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need for themselves to retire. Of the four styles, the monarch is the least likely to groom a
candidate for succession. By contrast the general’s style of departure is to reluctantly
agree to leave office but then they will mount a campaign to allow them to return to
office. It is a strong desire to establish a lasting legacy that keeps a general from
completely retiring. Over 90% of generals maintained a position in the organization from
which they retired. Often this position was used as a way to secure a path back into
leadership if they could.
Relay race. Once a firm has gotten past the initial succession the process of
repeating, it can be built into the practices and culture of the organization. The
overwhelming amount of research literature on CEO succession is based on firms that
have successfully transferred power a number of times. As such the process can become
much more formalized and analogies to other transfers of control can be drawn. One such
analogy is the concept of two runners passing a baton in a race.
For Vancil (1987), whose research falls firmly into the voluntary category,
succession is best described as the aforementioned relay race. The process starts off when
a candidate is named the heir apparent by their being promoted to the role of president.
During a period that can last for several years, the chairman of the board whom also
holds the title of CEO and the president run the organization together. During the
transition period, the two leaders act as relay partners in a relay race where a baton is
passed from one runner to the next. Vancil (1987) also described some situations where
there can be more than one candidate for the succession. In these cases the candidates
share responsibilities and compete with one another for the final role of CEO.
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As time goes by, more and more of the duties of the CEO are passed to the
president until they are formally named as CEO. Again this dual mode of organizational
leadership can last for several years. When the chairman of the board finally passes his or
her role to the CEO, the succession is then said to be complete. The process of succession
will be started again when the CEO names a new president as the heir apparent. This
relay model of succession can have set backs if the candidate does not live up to
expectations during their tenure as either a president or as the CEO, in which case the
succession process may begin again with a new candidate.
Maximizing financial gain. For some leaders the act of succession is based on
maximizing their personal gain, whether that is in monetary or non-monetary ways
(Burkart et al., 2003). Leaders of a family run businesses are in the unique position of
deciding whether to pass control to a family member or to hire an outsider to run the firm.
In making the decision to pass control the founder has to decide who would be a better
manager. Unfortunately for the founder who is passing control to a family member,
research has that family members produce lower financial returns than non-family
members (Morck, Stangeland, & Yeung, 2000; Pérez-Gonzales, 2006). What may
outweigh the financial decision is a how much non-monetary benefit the founder might
enjoy by keeping the business in the family or by maintaining the family name with the
organization. Examples of non-monetary benefit could be political or social as in
ownership of newspapers or sports teams. Another aspect of family owned businesses is
to decide at the time of succession, how much equity they are willing to disperse in the
process of funding their retirement. Such dispersal will have an effect of subsequent
leadership successions.
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A contingency model for succession. Knowing that succession is inevitable,
using a mixed methods research methodology Rubenson and Gupta (1996) developed a
contingency model for the initial or founder succession. The authors based their model on
the idea that an organization should assess the ongoing utility of the current leader.
Fundamentally, there are three sequential decision points in the model. First, is whether
or not the needs of the organization have or will soon change. Second, does the founder
have the capability or even the desire to change so that they can adapt to the new needs of
the organization? Lastly, if the founder is unwilling to change can they impede the
succession process. Each of these three major contingency points are then moderated of a
number of sub-factors such as: the size of firm, the turbulence of the industry, the
percentage of equity owned by the founder, the number of outside board members, and
the amount of general management experience of the founder.
As many the of previously cited authors have said the needs of an organization
will change over time and the top management of the organization has to adapt to those
changes. Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) model is proposed as a method for an
organization to decide if it is time to cause the early succession of the founder. In their
research the authors enumerated 12 sub-factors and made predictions about each:
1. There will be a negative association between organizational size and tenure of the
founder.
2. There will be a negative association between the firm’s growth rate and tenure of
the founder.
3. There will be a negative association between the extension of the product line and
tenure of the founder.
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4. There will be a positive association between educational level and tenure of the
founder.
5. Assuming that the founder is younger than 55, there will be a positive association
between the amount of general management experience the founder has had
before founding the venture and tenure of the founder.
6. There will be a positive association between the diversity of functional
experiences the founder has before founding the venture and tenure of the
founder.
7. There will be a positive association between the amount of relevant industry and
tenure of the founder.
8. There will be a negative association between the dispersion of ownership and
tenure of the founder.
9. There will be a negative association between the amount of outside board
members and tenure of the founder.
10. There will be a positive association between a policy of promotion from within
and tenure of the founder.
11. There will be a positive association between a family dominated culture and
tenure of the founder.
12. There will be a negative association between industry turbulence and tenure of the
founder.
If the needs of an organization changed slowly enough, Rubenson and Grupta
(1996) believed that a founder might have enough time to adapt. In a previous study by
the authors (Rubenson & Gupta, 1992) involving 54 Fortune 1000 firms, the data
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revealed that the tenures of founders was twice as long for slowing growing firms as for
firms that experienced rapid growth. Additionally, the study revealed that firms with a
family dominated culture had founders with significantly longer tenures than non-family
dominated firms.
In their 1996 paper, Rubenson and Gupta called for research studies to
empirically test the validity of their model on smaller firms; the original data used to
form the model was from Fortune 1000 firms. They felt that in particular new research
might help family run firms to make better decisions concerning the succession process.
Summary
The amount of research literature on succession that has been published in the
past 50 years has been substantial. In the interests of brevity, this chapter has touched
upon a few of the area’s concerning CEO succession and then focused down on
succession literature concerning the founder. Due to the complexity of human
interactions many factors can have an effect on the post-succession success of an
organization.
The early work of Grusky (1960, 1961, 1963, 1964a, 1964b), Carlson (1961) and
others established a foundation upon which others have built. Variables that have been
studied over the past half century include the following: studies on the origin of
successors, how pre-succession organizational performance affected the succession
process, how the size of an organization affected the rate of succession, how the rate of
succession then affected the post succession performance of the organization, the various
contingencies in order for succession to take place, the characteristics of successors, the
succession process and how it is moderated by the board of directors, studies dealing with
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how the market reacts to succession, how organizations plan for the succession process,
the characteristics of the leader that is being replaced, the characteristics of the
organization prior to succession, studies on the process of succession itself, and what the
non-market related consequences are of the succession process.
Additionally, the research literature concerning founder succession was also
examined. The areas discussed were why founders are different than other CEO’s, the
pros and cons of replacing the founder, the succession models of Rubenson and Gupta
(1996), Sonnenfeld (1988), and Vancil (1987).
In the next chapter the research method for testing the explanatory power of the
Contingency Model for the Initial Succession by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) as it applies
to small firms will be presented. The research methodology that was chosen for the study
will also be discussed. An elaboration of the target population, sample size, and data
collection method will be given. Finally, a description of the data analysis techniques
used, the considerations for the use of human subjects, and the possible limitations of the
study will also be provided.
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology
In this chapter the researcher will discuss in detail the complete research
methodology and design undertaken in this research project. The chapter topics will
include the quantitative research methodology; the target population for the study;
aspects of the sample size, the method for data collection; the selection process of survey
instrument; the survey instruments’ reliability, both the internal and external validity; and
lastly a discussion of the data analysis processes.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is twofold. The first is to replicate and expand on
previous studies by Rubenson and Gupta (1992, 1996) who introduced a contingency
model for the initial succession of an organization. The second purpose is to verify that
their model is applicable to organizations that are substantially smaller than the original
54 Fortune 1000 companies that were studied. As such, the new target population was
organizations with fewer than 200 employees and those with revenues less than $200
million annually at the time of succession.
Research Method
There are many possible methods that can be employed for research purposes.
The two major disciples are quantitative and qualitative research (Leedy & Ormrod,
2005). Miles and Huberman (1994) stated that the best strategy for developing new
hypotheses, exploring new areas, and for general discovery is the qualitative
methodology. Qualitative research methodologies include grounded theory, case studies,
ethnography, or phenomenology. In many dissertations, a case study methodology is used
because of its ability to study, in depth, a particular event or group of individuals. Often,
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it is a result of the case study method that hypotheses are generated regarding the study
group or the event.
When the area of study or phenomena is poorly understood and there are few if
any developed theories, the appropriate research methodology to use is a called grounded
theory, where the developed theory is said to be grounded in the data, usually through
interviews or surveys (Creswell, 2002; Glaser, & Strauss, 1967). As the data is collected,
it is analyzed for thematic elements. These themes in the data are used to modify the data
collection process (Corbin & Strauss, 2007). As the data continues to be gathered, the
researcher will finally attain a point of saturation where no more new information is
being generated from the data collection process (Kelle, 2010). It is at this point that
researcher can now fully analyze the data collected and form a theory to explain the
themes that were found. Leedy and Ormand (2005) told us that qualitative researchers
study phenomenon in their natural setting and that they study them in all of their
complexity. Miles and Huberman (1994) said that the best strategy for developing new
hypotheses, exploring new areas, and for general discovery is the qualitative
methodology.
If a researcher has an existing hypothesis, it can be examined via descriptive
quantitative methods (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Working from a known theory the
researcher collects numerical data such as stock price, voting records, economic
indicators, or population densities. If the numerical data does not already exist, the
researcher can devise a survey instrument to collect numerical data about possible events,
attitudes, likes, or dislikes. Once the data has been acquired statistical methods can be
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applied to the data in order to determine associations between the data sets. Hypotheses
can then be empirically tested for their validity.
Given that the founder succession event has such a low survival rate and that
small sized businesses tend to not be publicly held, a qualitative study utilizing an
interview technique was deemed to be the most appropriate. Furthermore, this study was
an attempt to see if the contingency model of the initial succession applies to a different
population group from the group which was first studied in 1989 (Rubenson, 1989). In
principle, the research methodology used was the grounded theory approach. Instead of
starting with no developed categories or themes, this researcher used the 12 sub-factors of
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) as the starting point for the interview process. It was
proposed that for this study to reach a point where the data started to repeat itself a
minimum of 10 interviews would need to be conducted. If data repetition was not
achieved after 10 interviews, the interview process would then continue on a case-bycase basis until a satisfactory level of data repetition was achieved. Given the exploratory
nature of this study, the possible travel involved, and resource limitations, 10 interviews
seemed to be a reasonable starting number. Some researchers suggested a pool of
between 6 to 12 interviewees; while others have held that there no specific number is
needed (Skeat & Perry, 2008). In the end, a total of 15 successors were interviewed to
achieve data repetition.
Target Population, Sample Size, and Data Collection Method
According to Neuman (2003), a target population is a substantial group of test
subjects from which a sample is drawn. Care must be taken in the selection of the target
population so that the results of the study can be generalized back to the general
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population group (McMillian & Schumacher, 2006). Simply put, a sample size is the
number of test subjects in the study. As will be explained later, the sample size for this
research study was quite small relative to the target population. With such a small sample
size the qualitative data methodology of one on one, interviews became the best viable
option. When using interviews for data collection, Creswell (2002) reminded the
interviewer to be cautious about adding bias to the participants’' answers.
Target population. The general population that this study is focused on is the
successors of small sized established organizations that have completed the process of a
founder transition within the last 5 years. Because all organizations will, at one time or
another, be faced with a founder succession, the general population for the study is very
large. According to census data prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce (2009)
the total number of firms in the United States that are classified as small business
employers is 5,767,306. The original research study (Rubenson, 1989), on which this
study is extending, used a target population consisting of Fortune 1000 firms, founded
between 1945 and 1970, that had experienced an initial succession before 1983. In the
later article by Rubenson and Gupta (1996), the authors proposed that further research
was needed to validate their contingency model for smaller organizations.
For the purposes of the current study, the target population were organizations
with $5 million to $200 million in annual revenue and with 200 employees or less at the
time of succession that are located in southern California. The limiting values of $200
million and 200 employees are arbitrary in nature and only meant to limit the size of the
target population to small organizations. In order to be considered as established, the
organizations will have had to been formed before 2006. There were no restrictions
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placed on the industry in which the organization operates. Even with these limitations
placed on the target population, the total size of the target population was still very large.
Most of the participants were selected by using a technique known as “theoretical
sampling” (Corbin & Strauss, 2007, p. 143). According to Corbin and Strauss, theoretical
sampling is the primary method used in grounded theory research to capture data that is
most likely to assist in the formation of a theory about the process under study.
According to theoretical sampling, the selection of later interview participants is
influenced by data that was collected in the earlier interviews (Skeat & Perry, 2008). As
the study progressed, interview participants were selected by their ability to provide
additional data that could be used to construct a theory of the process under study.
The first attempt to build a list of possible participants was to contact the
Chamber of Commerce Association presidents for Ventura and Los Angeles counties in
Southern California. Each chamber president was informed of the nature of the proposed
research and was asked to provide a list of possible companies that fit the previously
mentioned criteria. After eliminating companies from the list with less that $5 million in
revenue, a letter of introduction with a request to participate in the study was emailed to
those companies that are located in southern California. The original number of positive
responders turned out to be too low to produce at list of 10 viable interviews. Because of
the low response rate, the search was expanded by contacting the Chamber of Commerce
presidents in Orange, San Diego, San Bernardino, and Santa Barbara counties, all of
which are located in Southern California.
At the conclusion of each interview, the interviewee was asked if they could refer
the interviewer to any other organizations that has recently under gone a succession. This
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technique for expanding the sample population is known as snowball or chain referral
sampling (Creswell, 2002; McMillan & Schumacher, 2006). During the process of
interviewing each successor they were asked to nominate two or three other possible
candidates they might know of so as to expand the possible supply of viable candidates
needed for this study.
Data collection technique. The data collection tool that was used in this study
was a personal interview with the recent successor of the company. The interview was
the primary method for obtaining data. Each interview lasted approximately 1 hour in
length and was recorded for later transcription. Charmaz (2000) informed us that the
interview process is the one most commonly employed techniques when gathering data
for grounded theory research. Given that the research was an attempt to validate a
previous model, the first part of the interview consisted of a structured set of questions
that focused on the 12 sub-factors that Rubenson and Gupta (1996) enumerated in their
model. Each structured question was followed by a descriptive question as to how
important the sub-factor was in the process of succession and why or why not it played a
role.
The second half of the interview was used to ask unstructured questions of the
founder’s succession experience. The unstructured nature of the interview process
allowed the researcher to ask follow up questions to “distinguish between the noise and
the music in ones data” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2010, p. 496). If there was a need for a
clarification of an answer given during the interview, a follow up phone call was made to
the participant.
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The recorded interviews were then sent to an independent transcription service,
with whom the researcher executed a non-disclosure agreement. The service transcribed
the recordings into a text copy of the interview. The text file was analyzed for repeated
phrases and words to assist the researcher in identifying themes in the data.
The interview process. As was noted previously, the number of succession
studies has increased over the years but there is a shortage of studies that focus on
founder succession. As a result, there is a lack of validated survey instruments to address
the peculiarities of smaller business founder succession. Rather than relying on a survey
instrument for gathering of succession data, the researcher employed a semi-structured
interview approach. Creswell (2002) explained this approach:
In semi-structured interviews, the researcher asks some questions that are closeended and some questions that are open-ended. The advantage of this type of
interviewing is that the pre-determined close-ended responses can net useful
information to support theories and concepts in the literature. The open-ended
responses, on the other hand, can allow the participant to provide personal
experiences that may be outside or beyond those identified in the close-ended
options. (p. 205)
Given that the research study was prompted by a request from Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) to validate their model with smaller organizations, all 12 of their original
sub-factors were framed as both closed-ended and open-ended questions during the
interview. A copy of the questions used in the interviews can be found in Appendix A.
Internal and external threats to validity. There can be many threats to the
internal validity of a study (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006). The threats that could have
an influence in this study are the selection of companies to examine, major historical
events during the study, maturation of the persons being interviewed, and
instrumentation.
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One of the fundamental tenets of grounded theory and theoretical sampling is that
the investigative process follows the data. McMillan and Schumacher (2006) indicated a
threat to internal validity can exist if the sample population is not randomly selected. In
order to start the study with an amount of randomness, the first 3 companies that were
interviewed were randomly selected from a pool of 20 companies that met the previously
mentioned criteria.
Historical events do affect the pace of business transactions. Generally speaking,
more IPOs will be attempted during good economic times than during bad ones. The
reasons and process for a founder’s succession could be influenced by a good or a bad
economic climate. Since this was a grounded theory study, the effect of a good or a bad
economic climate might have played a significant part in the succession process. External
historical events can be minimized by conducting research during a period of modest
economic growth thereby reducing the threat to the internal validity of the study.
The issue of maturation could be an issue with this study due to the time between
the succession and the time of the interview. One of the limits placed on the selection of
companies is that the IPO needs to have been completed within the last 5 years. In an
attempt to keep the events as fresh as possible in the minds of the successors, targeted
companies were selected with a preference towards those that have completed their
succession most recently. Ordering the sequence of companies to be interviewed such
that the ones that have had a recent succession were interviewed first was an attempt to
reduce the effects of memory loss of the events that led up to the succession.
In this research study, the primary instrument for collecting data was the
interview. How an interview is conducted could compromise the validity of the
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instrument. In order to increase the internal validity of the study a pilot test of the
interview process was performed. The pilot run consisted of 2 interviews out of the pool
of 20 candidate companies. According to Creswell (2002), pilot studies can help to
improve the interview process. The pilot test allowed for practice in administering the
interview, collecting the data, and ensuring that all the questions could be finished in a 1hour session.
An external threat to the validity of the study would be the inability to generalize
the study from the sample population to the general population. The companies in this
study might not be representative of the rest of the small business population in the
United States. There is a tremendous variance in the size of organizations in the U.S. and
this study could only cover a small segment. Geographically, the study will take place in
California, which is ranked number 1 economically in the country as well as number 8 in
the world; California’s economy might have an effect of the applicability of the study to
economically depressed areas of the country.
There was the chance that the study was done during a particularly stable and
prosperous period of time or during a period of severe economic depression. With over
90% of the business in the United States being family owned, the number of founder
transitions every year will be quite large (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983). Whether it is a good
or a bad economic period, the only likely effect would be the pace at which the founder
transitions occur. Finally, there might be industry differences and the sample population
might not have been large enough to include a wide variety of industries.
Coverage of study’s core research questions. This research study had three core
questions to investigate:
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1) Is the Contingency Model of the Initial Succession proposed by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) transferable to organizations of smaller size and lower
revenues?
2) Are the founders of small sized organizations planning for their eventual
succession?
3) What other factors came into play beyond those outlined by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) during the succession process?
Data for all three of these core research questions were gathered by the interview
process outlined in the next few paragraphs. Core research question 1, which is
concerned with the transferability of the Contingency Model of the Initial Succession
(Rubenson & Gupta, 1989), was covered by asking the interviewee to respond to a series
of questions related to the previous work done by Rubenson and Gupta (1996). Core
research questions 2 and 3, which are meant to discover new data on the subject of
succession, were addressed by unstructured follow up questions.
Interview questions. In the original 1989 study by Rubenson, 28 hypotheses
were proposed. Of those 28 hypotheses, only 7 were strongly supported; an additional 9
only held partial support. In a later collaborative article by Rubenson and Gupta (1996),
the authors reduced the original 28 hypotheses to 12 antecedents that they felt might hold
significance; it is these 12 postulated antecedents or sub-factors to succession that will
form the core of the interview questions.
The purpose of this exploratory study was to better understand the processes that
take place leading up to and during the hand over from the CEO-founder of an
organization to a successor. As was stated earlier in this proposal, the high failure rate of
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founder successions demonstrates the need for a better understanding of the processes
involving succession. As part of the interview process, each of these areas was explored
to augment the original 12 sub-factors. Lastly, two open-ended questions were given. The
first of which was to allow the interviewee to discuss what, if any, planning was done
prior to the succession process. The second one gave the interviewee the opportunity to
supply any additional thoughts on how they felt that the succession process could have
been improved.
The first three sub-factors can be grouped together since they are concerned with
the changing needs of the organization and how they affect the founder. These subfactors concern the size of the firm, the growth rate of the firm, and the proliferation of
the firm’s product offerings. Rubenson and Gupta (1996) felt that a founder’s skill set
was more often aligned with handling smaller organizations than with much larger
organizations; that as the organization changed, the founder less likely to be able to meet
the new challenges.
Given that the organization is changing, the next major grouping of sub-factors
was centered on the founder’s ability to adapt to the new reality that a changing
organization brings. Of concern to Rubenson and Gupta (1996) were the founder’s
educational level, how many years of general management experience they might have,
how broad their functional experiences have been, and lastly how much industry
experience they have for their organization. Once an organization grows beyond the
startup stages and matures into a larger organization, Rubenson and Gupta (1996) felt that
the better a founder was prepared to be a general manager, the longer their tenure would
be.
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The last grouping of sub-factors that Rubenson and Gupta (1996) proposed dealt
with whether a founder could impede their own succession. The factors that would affect
a founder’s ability to keep their position are the dispersion of ownership, the percentage
of inside board members, whether there was a policy of promotion from within, if the
organization has a family dominated culture, and the amount of environmental
turbulence.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) succession model said that if the needs of the
organization are changing, if the founder is unable to adapt, and if they are unable to
impede their succession then it is highly likely that a succession event will occur. Each of
these 12 sub-factors was explored in the interview process for their relevance to the
succession process. Additionally, the researcher gave the interviewee the option of
identifying what additional factors came into play during their succession event. These
additional points of data were used to assess the completeness of the contingency model
of succession.
Data Analysis
Neuman (2003) informed us that a researcher can ask three types of questions:
descriptive, structural, and comparative. Due to the nature of this research study, all three
types of questions were asked of the interviewees. At the center of the interview process
are questions that explore the original 12 sub-factors, which are structured. The
interviewer then accompanied each of the 12 structured questions with both a
comparative question and a descriptive question. Additionally, some general background
questions were asked so as to assess if the interviewee still falls within the preferred
sample population.
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Structured questions. The purpose of this research was to test the explanatory
power of the original study by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) in small sized organizations.
In order to do so the originally postulated antecedent variables of Rubenson and Gupta
(1996) have been formed into structured questions. In both experimental and nonexperimental research there are two types of variables that can be studied: dependent and
independent variables. A dependent variable is the outcome or event under examination.
In experimental research, the independent variable is the variable that is manipulated to
see if it has an effect on the dependent variable (McMillian & Schumacher, 2006). For
non-experimental research, the variable is one that cannot be changed or manipulated. In
this non-experimental study the dependent variable is the event of founder succession and
the original 12 antecedents Rubenson and Gupta (1996) are the independent variables.
The 12 independent variables are thus:
V1:

The expansion of the original product line or services.

V2:

The educational level of the founder.

V3:

A policy of promotion from within.

V4:

The size of the organization.

V5:

The growth rate of the organization.

V6:

The amount of prior general management experience of the founder.

V7:

The diversity of prior functional experiences of the founder.

V8:

The amount of relevant industry experience the founder has.

V9:

Ownership dispersion in the organization.

V10:

The number of outside board members in the organization.

V11:

Family domination of the organizational culture.
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V12:

The amount of turbulence in the organizations industry.

Each of these variables was formed into questions and then each was followed up
with both a comparative and descriptive question. The comparative question was to ask
how important the interviewee felt the variable was in the succession process. The
descriptive question will ask why the interviewee felt the variable did or did not hold
significance in the succession process.
The following is a mapping of the 12 independent variables to the questions found
in Appendix A:
Table 1
Mapping of Independent Research Variables to Research Questions
Independent Variable

Research Question

The expansion of the original product line or services.

Question 10

The educational level of the founder.

Question 11

A policy of promotion from within.

Question 17

The size of the organization.

Question 5

The growth rate of the organization.

Questions 6, 7, 8, and 9

The amount of prior general management experience

Questions 3 and 12

of the founder.
The diversity of prior functional experiences of the

Question 13

founder.
The amount of relevant industry experience the founder

Question 14

has.
(continued)
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Independent Variable

Research Question

Ownership dispersion in the organization.

Question 15

The number of outside board members in the

Question 16

organization.
Family domination of the organizational culture.

Question 18

The amount of turbulence in the organizations industry.

Question 19

Given that the number of participants was less than 30, no quantitative statistical
analysis can be done on the numerical data acquired other than simple averages. Only
generalized associations can be drawn from the numerical data. The structured questions
were instead used, as Neuman (2003) informed, as the starting point for the data
collection process that will lead to further refinement of the interview questions
Unstructured questions. The data analysis in grounded theory research normally
follows a four-stage procedure (Charmaz, 2000; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) Stage one
consists of an “open coding” procedure where the text of the interview was broken down
into meaning units (Kelle, 2010, p. 196). Stage two involves combining the codes or
meaning units into concept groups. In the third stage, the concepts are grouped together
into categories. Finally the categories are used to produce a theory via axial coding,
which can explain the processes under study. This four-stage process was followed early
in the cycle of interviews to help improve the later selection of participants and also to
improve the effectiveness of the following interviews.
As each interview was analyzed by the researcher he searched for concepts,
similar ideas or features, and themes that keep reoccurring. Each of these units of
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meaning was assigned codes as part of the open coding process (Neuman, 2000). As part
of the data reduction process the research processed each interview and prepared coding
tables where the codes were grouped into preliminary categories. As new themes and
concepts were discovered, the previous interview data was reprocessed for the newly
discovered codes. It is in this manner that a new concept or theory is said to be grounded
in the data (Neuman, 2000).
One key concept in grounded theory research is the notion of theoretical
saturation of categories (Kelle, 2010). Saturation was reached when no more new
information or concepts were gained by the interview process. Once the data starts to
repeated itself, the interviews were discontinued and the process of going back over the
data to verify the categories began.
Concept groups and major categories for the codes were formed as the data were
analyzed. As new sub-categories arose, previous code groupings were re-evaluated to
more perfectly align concepts to new categories. After all the interviews were coded and
the research felt that a point of saturation had been reached where no new themes can be
identified in the data, the researcher constructed a final set of major categories for the
data themes.
As the final list of categories was established, the researcher identified a core
category to act as an axis upon which a theory could be constructed. According to Corbin
and Strauss (2007) axial coding can also happen during the open coding process. Having
identified a core concept the researcher then identified the causal conditions for the need
for a succession or a condition that might delay it. These causal conditions may be found
in the original data categories that were constructed during the open coding process.
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According to Creswell (2002), axial coding results in a specific set of actions that
result from the core category. In the case of this research, those actions are the dependent
variable, a succession event. Creswell continued that the actions have both a context and
influence factors for the actions. As part of the axial coding process and theory
development, the researcher identified both the contexts and influencing factors in the
succession event by going back over the interview data with the central category in mind.
By definition, in grounded theory research the theory is supposed to rise up out of
the data collected. As such, the researcher must engage in the process without any predetermined theories or assumptions. This can be challenging if the researcher has preconceived notions about causal relationships that would bias the data collection process.
The possibility of bias can be reduced by involving more than one person in the open
coding and by creating concept groups. A further reduction of bias was achieved by
having all the interviews electronically transcribed to eliminate any bias that might have
occurred during note taking. In this research study, the recorded interviews were
transcribed by a medical transcription service with whom the researcher signed a
confidentiality agreement. The preliminary open coding of the transcribed documents
was done with the assistance of computer software so as to reduce the number of missed
themes.
Considerations for Use of Human Subjects
From the proposed list of candidate companies, an email was sent to each CEO to
ascertain if the CEO is available and interested in participating in the research study. If
the CEO responded that she or he was interested in participating, another email was sent
that described the study in detail and included a sample set of questions to inform the
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prospective participant of the type of questions that would be asked. In addition, a
consent form was mailed to the prospective participant for their signature.
Once a signed consent form was returned, a phone call was made to the
participant to explain that participation was optional, voluntary, and that there were no
adverse consequences for terminating participation at any point. Issues of confidentiality
were explained as well as the process of reducing the data collected to a form that would
enhance their anonymity.
On the day of the interview, the participant was informed once again that
participation was optional and that they could terminate the interview at any time. A
duplicate consent was signed and given to the research subject for their records.
This research study was one that involved face-to-face interactions with human
subjects. The participants were successor CEOs of small companies; therefore, they were
not classified as needing special protections as a member of a vulnerable population.
Possible Study Limitations
The primary goal of this study was test the explanatory power of the original
study by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) as it might apply to small sized companies. Given
that the new target population is vastly larger than the original one, attempting to capture
even 1% of the new target population would have been extremely difficult. With a
sample population of less than 30 interviews, the data collected might be skewed away
from the general population norms.
Another limitation is that the sample population used in the study was located in
one geographic area of the country, namely southern California, and therefore might have
social norms that are different from other regions of the country. Therefore, one possible
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limitation of the study might be that it might not be able to be generalized to the larger
population.
Lastly the validity of a research study is limited to the reliability of the data and
instruments used. This research project collected data through an interview process and
relied on the honesty of the answers given by the people interviewed. Given that some of
the successions were not done under ideal conditions, the interviewees might have had a
motivation to respond in ways that enhanced their image as a successful leader. It was up
to the interviewer to determine if the answers given at the time were honest and unbiased.
Summary
Chapter three addressed the research methodology designed to undertake the
research project, the new target population for the study, certain aspects of the sample
size, what method for data collection was employed, how the survey instrument was
selected, the instruments reliability, both the internal and external validity of the study,
and a discussion of the various data analysis processes that was untaken.
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Chapter Four: Results
The purpose of this study was to determine the applicability of the Contingency
Model of the Initial Succession (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996) to a new target population. In
this chapter, the researcher will present the findings of the analysis that was performed on
the collected data. The researcher used a qualitative research methodology to answer the
following research questions.
4. Is the Contingency Model of the Initial Succession proposed by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) transferable to organizations of smaller size and lower revenues?
5. Were the founders of small sized organizations planning for their eventual
succession?
6. What other factors came into play beyond those outlined by Rubenson and Gupta
(1996) during the succession process?
Data Collection
The researcher used a combination of structured and unstructured questions
during the interviews of 15 CEOs about the process of succession from the founder to
them as the next organizational leader. Fourteen of the interviews were conducted at the
successor’s primary company location at a date and time of their choosing; one interview
was conducted via telephone due to distance and scheduling issues. The interviews were
conducted in private to give the research subject freedom to talk without other members
of the organization overhearing them. During the interviews the researcher encouraged
the interviewees to express what they felt were the salient aspects of the founder
transition as well as to how important they felt each of the 12 sub-factors in Rubenson
and Gupta’s (1996) model were to the transition. The researcher had the successors rate
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Rubenson and Gupta’s 12 sub-factors on a scale of 1 to 10 as to how much they felt the
factor had as a causal influence for the succession to take place.
Interviewee Profiles
Fifteen successor CEOs were interviewed for this study: 3 were female and 12
were male. In order to be included in this study, the CEO must have been the first leader
to succeed the founder as the new primary leader in the organization. The elapsed time
between the succession completion date and the research interview date had to have been
5 years or less. The range of annual revenue was between $5 million and $200 million
dollars at the time of the transition. Lastly, the organizations must have had less than 200
employees at the time of transition. The demographic information gathered during the
interview process is presented in Table 2. Industry classifications from the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Standard Industrial Classification System’s Major Groups (2008)
are used in order to provide confidentiality for the organizations and CEO’s involved in
the study. Due to the length of time required to contact each of the chamber presidents, to
contact each of candidates, and the low number of companies found that matched the
target population, the researcher employed chain reference sampling as a method to find
more candidates. The referrals the successors favored individuals in the same industry as
the successors; this is why there are duplicate industries represented in Table 2.
Data Acquisition Methodology
The initial list of participating companies was suggested for inclusion in the study
by conversations with the presidents of southern California chambers of commerce. One
hundred twelve chambers were contacted via email and phone conversation to inquire if
they knew of any organizations in their chambers who had recently undergone a founder
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transition or who were currently in transition. Of the 112 chambers contacted, 24 of them
responded with possible candidates for the study. Combining the recommended
companies from the 24 chamber presidents yielded a list of 58 possible candidate
companies. An attempt was made to contact the current leader of each of these companies
by both email and phone calls. Out of the 58 companies 10 successors agreed to
participate in the study.
Table 2
Profiles of Participating Successors
Successor

Industry Classification

Age at Transition

Years in Control

S1

Chemicals and Allied Products

64

22

S2

Real Estate Operators and Lessors

51

50

S3

Motion Picture Production

65

17

S4

Offices and Clinics of Dentists

62

31

S5

Miscellaneous Shopping Goods Stores

74

20

S6

Laboratory Analytical Instruments

75

25

S7

Construction

69

26

S8

Eating And Drinking Places

67

12

S9

Construction

56

18

S10

Real Estate Operators and Lessors

76

59

S11

Management Consulting Services

69

24

S12

Management Consulting Services

63

26

(continued)
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Successor
S13

Industry Classification

Age at Transition

Computers and Computer Peripheral

Years in Control

51

8

65

20

69

22

Equipment and Software
S14

Computers and Computer Peripheral
Equipment and Software

S15

Management Consulting Services

An additional five companies were added to the research study by employing
chain referral sampling (Creswell, 2002; McMillan & Schumacher, 2006), which entailed
asking each of the original 10 successors if they knew of any other companies that had
recently undergone a succession. The entire process of obtaining and interviewing
candidates was completed in approximately 5 months.
Analysis of Interview Questions
All except for one of the interviews was conducted in a private face-to-face
conversation and lasted for approximately one hour each. The one interview that was not
done in a face-to-face format was conducted via a telephone conversation. All of
interviews were audiotape recorded and later transcribed by a professional transcription
service into a Microsoft Word formatted document. During the interview, process the
researcher took notes about the responses given to the questions and also asked for
expanded details when warranted to complete an answer to a question. These transcripts
along with the notes taken by the researcher were used as the basis for the data analysis.
Gay and Airasian (1999) offered that a researcher has three options for collecting data
during an interview: note taking during the interview, recording notes after the interview,
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and the most viable in their opinion is tape recording the interview. Every interview
followed the same process in order to minimize any variation in the presentation of the
questions.
Each research subject was asked the same 25 questions. In grounded theory
research, it is a common practice to allow the collected data to modify the questions
asked during the interview process so as to allow the discovery of new data (Corbin &
Strauss, 2007). During the course of the 15 interviews, the researcher found no need to
modify the interview questions as the data seemed to be falling in line with the original
research questions. Twelve of the questions, numbers 7 through 22, were directly related
to the sub-factors Rubenson and Gupta (1996) proposed as being significant in their
Contingence Model of the Initial Succession. Each of these factors were rated on a scale
of 1 to 10 by the successor as to how important he or she felt the factors was to the
initiation of the succession process. Additionally the successor was asked to provide a
detailed explanation for their rating of the factor. Question numbers 23 and 25 dealt with
succession planning, while question 24 probed the interviewee for succession factors
outside of Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) proposed model. Questions 1 through 6 were
collected as background information for the study. Each of these three question groups
will be analyzed in the following paragraphs.
In order to find new thematic information from the response to the unstructured
questions, a four-stage procedure was followed (Charmaz, 2000; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
After each of the interviews was transcribed into a text document, the transcribed
interviews were imported into a computer software package called Nvivo 10 for
manipulation and analysis. As part of the first stage, phrases the researcher felt were
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relevant to the succession process were collected out of the texts. Once all the pertinent
phrases were collected, the second stage consisted of sorting the phrases into concept
groups. The third stage consisted of further grouping the concepts into categories.
Finally, in the fourth stage, the categories were reviewed against the original interviews
to determine if new concepts could be found in the data.
During the interview process, the researcher collected numerical values from 16
of the 25 questions. Table 3 is a summary of the statistical data collected during the
interviews. Where possible, the researcher calculated a simple average for the collected
values. The three columns of Table 3 include the question asked of the research subject,
the average value of all 15 responses, and the average score of importance for each
question as it related to being part of the cause for the founder’s succession. Although the
annual revenue of the organization at the time of succession was not part of the original
study, all of the research search subjects volunteered a rating for its importance. Annual
revenues for the organizations were not provided by all of the organizations; therefore, an
average value was not calculated.
Table 3
Average Scores for Questions 4 Through 23
Question

Average Value

Average Importance

Age of Founder

65

N/A

Years in Control of Organization

25.3

N/A

Sales Revenue

N/A

3.13

Product Change

68.7%

3.50
(continued)
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Question

Average Value

Average Importance

Education Level

3.13

1.90

Years of Management

30.2

2.90

Functional Experience Breadth

9.07 out of 10

2.57

Industry Experience

9.00 out of 10

2.10

Founder Equity

74.0%

4.90

Board of Director Insiders

85%

3.07

Inside Promotion Policy

60%

6.37

Family Influence on Organization Culture

93%

7.77

Industry Turbulence

N/A

3.77

Planned for Succession

40%

N/A

Three of the importance averages show values of non-applicable. These three
questions were not part of the original study by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) and were
therefore not scored. In the responses for the size of the organization some, but not all, of
the research subjects responded with their annual revenues in addition to the number of
employees. Due to the incomplete set of revenue data, the average value was not
calculated. When asked about industry turbulence, the research subjects gave so many
different answers that applying a scale to their answers proved to be intractable. As a
result, the average score for industry turbulence was not calculated. In order to provide a
side-by-side comparison of the average scores for each of the research questions, Figure 1
is provided.
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Figure 1. Average scores for importance on the succession event.
Analysis of Interview Questions 1 through 6
Questions 1 through 6 dealt with background information about the founder and
his or her organization. All of the organizations were privately held and only one
organization had an externally controlled board. Because all of the organizations were
privately held, question number 12 which dealt with public companies became void. On
average, the succession event happened 4.47 years previously for the 10 organizations
that had completed their succession. Of the five remaining organizations, the successor
indicated that the succession would be completed within 18 months. The average age of
the founder in the study at the time of succession was 65 years old and they were in
control of the organization for an average of 25.3 years. There were 8 different types of
organizations represented in the study. One organization was an agricultural chemical
company, two were commercial property development companies, and another was an
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entertainment-media post production company. There was a medical firm, a retail jewelry
company, a scientific instrument company, and two organizations were general
construction companies. Finally one company was a multi-establishment restaurant
organization, three companies provided construction management services, and two
companies were in the computer technology industry.
Analysis of Interview Question 7
Question 7 asked, What was the size of organization at the time of transition, how
important was this in the succession event, and why? The size of the organization was
assessed by the number of employees at the time of succession. Additionally, many of the
research subjects also supplied their estimated annual revenue in sales. As is noted in
Table 3, the average number of employees for the organizations at the time of transition
was 59. The supplied revenue numbers were used to assess question 8 as it related to
organizational growth. When asked how important this factor was in precipitating the
succession event, the average score was 2.9 out of 10. When asked why or why not this
element was important, three themes arose:
1. At the time of succession, the founder was able to handle the both the number of
employees and the sales volume of the organization.
2. A health scare caused the founder to doubt his or her ability to continue
performing at a level required to sustain the business.
3. Self doubts by the founder in his or her ability to make sound business decisions.
Of the three themes, two thirds of the successors did not consider the size of the
organization as an issue that triggered the founder’s passing of the organizational control
to them. Research subject S1 gave a typical response:
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Well the size of the organization was irrelevant because the succession
had already been planned, we had been planning this since 2002. The
acquisition just happened to come along at about at the same time.
Therefore, the size of the organization was irrelevant to the transition. We
had been pretty flat in employees except when we did an acquisition.
It was all part of that turbulence in the industry why we had the
opportunity, we were able to weather that turbulence, another company
wasn’t so we were able to acquire another company that wasn’t good with
dealing with turbulence. To look at going from where they were as a small
individual company to now a new merged company, say you had three
companies and they all have 25 employees and now those same guys are
managing 75, now that was huge. That was not the real cause of the
succession, the real cause of succession was age. (S1, personal
communication, April 5, 2012)
Analysis of Interview Questions 8 Through 11
Due to the way in which a question of growth could be understood to mean
different things to different people, this factor in Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) proposed
model has been asked in four parts. The first being the overall growth rate of the
organization and then three sub-factors of growth. The first sub-factor was the growth in
the number of employee’s, the second was the growth rate in sales, and the third and final
sub-factor was the growth rate in the number of customers. Each interviewee was then
asked to combine all three of these sub-factors into a single score of 1 to 10 as to how
much organization growth affected the succession event of the founder.
Question 8 was What was been the overall rate of growth for the organization
during the founder’s tenure, how important was this in the succession event, and why?
The successors gave this combined factor an average score of 3.13 out of 10 in its
importance in the cause of the succession. Three of the organizations described their
organizational growth as either flat or in a declining state. Two of the organizations
experienced growth rates in excess of 30% per annum. The remaining 10 organizations
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described their growth levels as either modest or moderate in nature. Only research
subject S8 believed that overall organizational grow was a significant factor in the
succession event. The founder had told the S8 that he just did not have the energy to run
the day-to-day operations:
Growth rate was pretty modest I would say because we modestly tracked up and
then really accelerated because we have added locations. It was very modest at
first. You know we basically had our people and, and didn’t need many more, so I
would say that it was probably 2%, the growth rate on employees, but what
happened in 2008 is that it jumped huge, both, both sales and employees because
we opened a new big place. I mean we had to hire about 170 people for one of our
places to open. There’s always a lot of attrition in the beginning. (S8, personal
communication, June 8, 2012)
Question 9 asked What has been the growth in the number of employees, how
important was this in the succession event, and why? Two of the organizations had
significant growth in the number of employees, greater than 30% per year. The rest of the
organizations had growth rates of 1% to 5% per year. Four of the organizations’
employee counts changed depending the number of customer contracts they had at any
given moment. Only one of the successors interviewed had a negative growth rate in the
number of employees.
Question 10 was What was been the growth in the sales revenue, how important
was this in the succession event, and why? Two of the organizations reported high rates
of growth, 30% or more per year. One of the organizations reported having a steady
decline in sales in the years leading up to the succession, while two of the organizations
reported that sales had leveled off during the years leading up to the succession. The rest
of the organizations reported overall modest to steady growth in sales revenues. Research
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subject S13 responded that it was the lack of sales growth that lead to the succession
event:
I think the thing that triggered it was the company reached a certain size and [it]
flattened for a year, [and that he] could not get any further growth in the business
in a market growing at 30%, is tragic. The pressure internally from the board and
CEO was enormous to identify the root cause of that and then how do you put the
company back into a growth trajectory. I think it was pretty quickly discerned
between the board and the CEO that there needed to be a change. And then it was
like we got to make this change happen. (S13, personal communication, June 9,
2012)
Question 11 was What was been the growth in the number of customers, how
important was this in the succession event, and why? For each of the successors
interviewed, the growth in customers closely matched the growth in revenues. One of the
organizations had a high customer growth rate of 50% per year and another had 35% per
year. Research subject S6 indicated that the rapid growth rate had gotten out of hand for
the founder:
The real growth occurred in the decade of the 2000. I believe he liked growth, he
set out to grow, and we expanded. I joined the company in 2001 and that certainly
helped, but we set out to expand both internationally and nationally. During the
five core years, during the ten years from 1995 to 2005, it was about 35% per
year, 35% annual growth rate. I think the company he wanted to grow, and we set
out to grow it, but the company rapidly became more and more complex. And it
was in some of that complexity that I think he began to recognize, was outside of
his domain. (S6, personal communication, June 4th, 2012)
Three of the successors described their customer growth rate as flat while the rest of the
successors described their growth in customers as modest or steady increase.
Analysis of Interview Question 13
Question 13 asked During the tenure of the founder how much has the initial
product offering or service expanded or changed, how important was this in the
succession event, and why? Nine out of the 15 successors interviewed reported that there
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had been extreme changes in the overall product offerings since the inception of the
organization. Three organizations reported no changes at all in their product offering
while the remaining three organizations reported modest changes in products and services
during the tenure of the founder. Despite the majority of the organizations undergoing
extreme changes in products and services offered, the reported influence score of these
changes on the succession event was only 3.68. When asked why the changes had so little
affect on the succession event the successor indicated that product change was an
expected aspect of their market space. More than one successor indicated that keeping up
with technology or regulatory changes was a personal characteristic the founder. Only
research subject S12 stated that the change in product offerings was a major reason for
the succession:
This is really a complicated industry. And it’s a really tough industry to work in.
This, I think, has a lot to do with burnout of the owner. He was tired of, you
know, chasing -- you’re constantly not just chasing the agency but also chasing
the large companies and also chasing politicos. We’ve changed, we still offer the
same services we initially offered. And in some circles that’s what we’re known
for. But we have expanded significantly. In the industry that we work in there’s
consultants that have all kinds of different niches, things that they do. If there’s 50
things that could be done, initially we did one. Now we probably do 20. (S12,
personal communication, July 14, 2012)
Analysis of Interview Question 14
Question 14 was What level of formal education has the founder achieved before
the transition, how important was this in the succession event, and why? Of the 15
founders, 2 had earned a doctorate degree, 3 had earned a masters degree, 7 had earned
their bachelors degree, and 3 had high school diplomas. Only one successor reported that
the education level of the founder had a significant influence on the succession event. In
all the other organizations, the successor reported that the founder was able to learn
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everything he or she needed to run his or her business as the organization grew. For two
of the founders with high school diplomas the successors reported that hard work and an
attention to the business was more than enough to allow them to successfully run their
multi-million dollar a year organizations. Research subject S2 related the following:
He just graduated from high school, he is a self made man. He just, you know, he
started off selling houses part-time. Given the opportunity, he would buy some
little apartment buildings and he just grew from there. He boot-strapped the thing
all the way up. Figured it out pretty much on his own. I think that because he has
continued to be involved for the past 20 years and has kept abreast of the changes
in the industry he understands it all, and his basic instincts are still relevant. (S2,
personal communication, April 9, 2012)
The average reported importance of formal education to the succession event was just
1.96 out of 10.
Analysis of Interview Question 15
Question 15 asked How many years of general management experience does/did
the founder have at the time of transition, how important was this in the succession event,
and why? The average number of years of general management experience the founders
had at the time of succession was 29.8 years. The highest number of years was 50 while
the lowest was 12 years. A score of 3.04 was reported for the importance of management
experience to the succession event. Several of the founders had been employed in general
management positions before founding their companies. Only research subject S8 felt
that the founder didn’t have enough general business acumen to run the organization as it
grew:
Well he was the head man. He was making decisions, he was significant, he wrote
the checks, but he had a bookkeeper. My dad’s pretty old school and HR, as it
existed for this company, was pretty lacking. We’re probably lucky to have gotten
through it all without any problems. He managed the whole thing, but we have
subordinate managers who have their purview and their own little areas of
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expertise. The bar manager would do the wine list and my dad had no input. I just
think he was starting from farther behind, it’s harder for an old school guy like
him. That is where I came in, it’s easier for a kid whose is 22 to learn this
business. (S8, personal communication, June 8, 2012)
Analysis of Interview Question 16
Question 16 was How varied was the functional experience of the founder at the
time of management, how important was this in the succession event, and why? In all but
two of the organizations, the founders were involved in all aspects of the organization as
it grew. In both of the exceptions, the founders delegated the responsibilities in which
they felt they were not proficient. The reported score for functional experience as a
precipitating factor in the succession event was 2.68 out of a possible 10.
Analysis of Interview Question 17
Question 17 was How much relevant industry experience did the founder have at
the time of transition, how important was this in the succession event, and why? Only 1
of the 15 founders was not considered to be an expert in their industry by their
successors. Several of the founders were heavily involved in their industry associations
and spoke at industry events. Research subject S4 related that the founder went above and
beyond what was his industry regulations required: “He took more CEs than would be
necessary. To continue our license its 50 hours a year, but. He took two year-long mini
residency courses that were probably 180 CE hours each.” For this factor, the successors
reported an average score of 2.18 out of a possible 10 for the influence it had on the
succession event.
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Analysis of Interview Question 18
Question number 18 asked How dispersed was the ownership of the firm at the
time of transition, how important was this in the succession event, and why? Three of the
15 successors reported that the founder had a minority ownership stake in the
organization at the time of succession; 7 of the founders had a 100% ownership position
at the time of succession. The remaining five founders had a majority shareholder status.
Six of the interviewed successors reported that founder’s ownership position had a
significant influence on the succession event. Additionally another 6 successors reported
that the founder’s ownership had no influence at all on the succession event. A common
response from the successors was that due to the founder's ownership position, the
founder set his or her own timetable for the succession. Research subject S11 gave a
typical response about the founder’s sense of control: “She reported to no one” (S11,
personal communication, May 17, 2012). The reported score for ownership dispersion as
a precipitating factor in the succession event was 5.25 out of a possible 10.
Analysis of Interview Question 19
Question 19 asked What percentage of the board of directors are neither related
to the founder in some way or would not be considered current employees of the firm,
how important was this in the succession event, and why? Only 1 of the 15 companies
reported that the board of directors of the organization had a majority of outside directors.
Several of the successors reported that the founder sought opinions from the board but
basically did as they pleased the vast majority of the time. The reported score for outside
board members affecting the succession event was 3.21 out of a possible 10.
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Analysis of Interview Question 20
Question 20 asked How much does the founder’s family influence the culture of
the organization, how important was this in the succession event, and why? Fourteen of
the 15 successors interview reported significant family influence in the organization.
Research subject S10 responded that she had to tell him it was time to retire:
This was his life. He didn’t want to think about it. He didn’t want to do it. And
then we came in and said, dad, you know, reality is 78 years old. You know, you
might want to think about retiring. He was 78. We didn’t want him to just keel
over and have like no plan at all, hello. I mean, it would have been so scary. It
would have been awful. (S10, personal communication, June 27, 2012)
The only organization to report no family influence on the culture of the
organization was the organization with a majority of outside members of the board of
directors. The reported score for family influence affecting the succession event was 7.68
out of a possible 10. This average score was the highest factor affecting the succession
event.
Analysis of Interview Question 21
Question 21 was Is there a policy of promotion from within the company for
recently vacated positions, how important was this in the succession event, and why?
Nine out of 15 of the organizations had policies of promoting people from within the
organization when positions were vacated. Ten of the successors interviewed were a
member of the founder’s family. Only one organization interviewed had a successor in
the CEO position while a member of the founder’s family was in a secondary
management position. While many of the successors admitted they had an inside track for
the position of next leader after the founder, S1 responded with the following:
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There is a policy of promotion of qualified people within the company, yes. It was
critical in the succession because that’s what they decided in 2002, they wanted
somebody from the inside to run it and had the policy of that. But we didn’t pass
it down to a family member. I said we promote qualified people from within. I
don’t care if they’re family, I don’t care if they’re not family.
I do not have a policy of nepotism, I'm anti-nepotism. My brother probably was
not as much, well he wasn’t, but no I would not have taken this position if I
wasn’t qualified for the position. So I might have had an inside track because I
was a family member, I didn’t get the job because I was a family member. I'm not
taking just about myself but that’s my policy so when you say promoted from
within, because I have a nephew working here, but he doesn’t automatically
become management because he is a family member. If he was qualified, he
would be in management, he’s not qualified so he stays as a salesman. So when I
say promote from within, I mean it is irrelevant what your name is from where
I'm at, and in the succession event that part was critical. I mean we needed
qualified people in here. (S1, personal communication, April 5, 2012)
The reported score for a policy of promotion from within the organization as a
precipitating factor in the succession event was 6.18 out of a possible 10.
Analysis of Interview Question 22
Question 22 asked How turbulent was the industry at the time of transition, how
important was this in the succession event, and why? Four of the successors responded
that their industries were very smooth and profitable. For the smooth industry
organizations, the succession of the founder was made easier due to good economic
times. Eleven of the successors reported that their industry turbulence was either very bad
or the worst in many decades. None of the 11 successors thought that industry turbulence
contributed to the succession of the founder. In fact, they saw the turbulence as a normal
part of the business. Research subject S2 gave this response:
Real estate is an interesting field and I guess that in some ways it’s almost always
turbulent. Either turbulent with opportunity or turbulent with risk. It seems like
real estate is either booming or busting and both boom and bust provide
opportunities and threats so even in a boom market, you know, a booming market
creates great opportunities but also takes threats. You know, you can end up being
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run over if you’re not taking advantage of the situation and a bust can destroy a
real estate company or provide great opportunities for a real estate company. So,
for example, this last four year period has been a horribly turbulent time in the
real estate market as everything you read about, but a great opportunity for us
because we can go out there and buy up everybody’s mistakes at a fraction of the
cost. (S2, personal communication, April 9, 2012)
Research subject S15 talked about how industry turbulence invigorated the founder:
I'd say right now it’s quite turbulent like so many industries. It’s turbulent from
both from construction and it’s not secret construction has taken a big hit even in
the latest recession, and so in terms of how turbulent was the industry at the time
of transition, quite turbulent. But how important was that in the succession event?
Not at all. Again, I think two reasons. One, there is no drop in his energy level or
the excitement of changing gears because of changing circumstances. He thrives
on turbulence. I think he loves challenges and a down economy is a challenge and
how to navigate is a challenge and I think that’s something that actually get his
juices going. (S15, personal communication, August 24, 2012)
The other 2 successors said that their industry turbulence tended to oscillate with the
current general economic conditions. The reported score for industry turbulence as a
precipitating factor in the succession event was 3.96 out of a possible 10.
Analysis of Interview Question 23
Question 23 was What planning, if any, was done prior to the need for the
succession? Only five of the successors reported that their organizations did any
advanced planning for the succession event. The concept of planning for a succession
event never occurred to six of the founders and this resulted the successors reporting the
succession process being very abrupt and short. Three of the successors indicated that the
founder had some ideas about the succession process but thought that the process would
take care of itself. Research subject S12 responded with:
His planning wasn’t done in a really systematic way. It was kind of like, I want
you to do this, and you figure out how to make it work. You know, I obviously
was thrown to the wolves when I first started. And, you know, good luck; figure it
out. I don’t know if that’s partly because he wasn’t sure how to help. Who to
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introduce me to; what was important and not important to pay attention to in the
business. (S12, personal communication, July 14, 2012 )
Analysis of Interview Question 24
Question 24 asked What factors or situations do you believe triggered the
appointment of a new leader in this organization? Five of founders had planned for
retirement and the succession was part of the plan. A prominent theme appeared during
the interviews concerning this question in that many of the founders were only thinking
in terms of cashing out their ownership as a definition of succession. Another five of the
successions were triggered by health issues. Several of the successions used the phrase
“heath scare” to describe the founder’s motivation behind the leadership transition. In
two of the successions, the founder decided that he or she was no longer capable of
running the organization effectively and started the process of choosing a new leader. The
last two successions were instigated by family members who persuaded the founder that
it was time for them to pass control to a new leader.
Research subject S15 related that the founder was introspective enough to realize
that one day a succession must happen:
He’s a realist by nature, so as far as I know he’s a realist. If he detects age
catching up with him, he would be the first to say ‘you know, I'm not about to be
a drag on the organization by sticking around longer than I need to be.’ He’s got
that ability to self-evaluate. But the reality is everybody ages at some point, at
some point you’re not as good as you used to be. So rather than having that
succession or the transition occur because it’s dictated, let’s initiate a transition
organizationally or collectively on our terms rather than letting health or other
events or a significant event dictate to us a transition. Because you have a lot less
control over it then, and I think the odds of the succession not going smoothly or
even failing increase when it’s not done on your terms or with albeit an informal
plan, it’s still a plan. (S15, personal communication, August 24, 2012)
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Analysis of Interview Question 25
Question 25 was What would you have done differently to improve the succession
process? The most common answer given to this question was that the successors would
have implemented a detailed plan for the transition. In only 5 of the 15 transitions was
there an actual plan of succession. In one of the planned successions, the founder
deceptively trained the successor for 2 years without the successor realizing he or she was
to be the new organizational leader. Another common concern of the successors had to do
with areas of responsibility during the transition. Apparently several founders
temporarily took back areas of responsibility that they had previously transferred to the
successor. A few of the successors complained that this vacillating back and forth of
responsibilities gave confusing messages to the organization as to who was responsible
for what. Ultimately this undermined the credibility of the successor.
Themes
The third research question for this study was What other factors came into play
beyond those outlined by Rubenson and Gupta during the succession process? During the
discourse of the approximately 15 hours of interviews, several themes arose. In order to
be included in this table the at least three of the research subjects must have alluded to or
mentioned them before, during, or after the interviews. These themes are summarized in
Table 4.
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Table 4
Discovered Themes
Theme

T1

Description

Times Expressed

Founders were not thinking in terms of legacy. They were

12

only thinking in terms of how to cash out of the business.
T2

They did not plan for the succession until it was thrust upon

9

them by illness, old age, or by their family.
T3

Founders did whatever they wanted because they owned the

8

majority shares.
T4

Successors were not inclined to confront the founder.

7

T5

Founders had a high level of self identification with the

7

business. They felt that they were the business.
T6

Founders hung onto the organization because it was their hobby.

4

Theme T1. When talking to the successors about the triggering event for the
succession, several of them discussed how the founder was attempting to find a way to
withdraw financial gains from the organization. Three of the founders used an employee
stock option plan to sell a portion of their equity back to the company; other founders
sold their equity to their successors. Several of the successors mentioned that the main
concern of the founders was how they could fund their retirement. In only 3 of the 15
organizations was there an attempt by the founder to insure that the organization would
grow and thrive after their departure by the equipping of the next leader. The majority of
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the successors were left to their own devices as to company direction and purpose
without extensive training or guidance. During the interviews, the successors implied that
the founders’ expectation was that the organization would just continue to function as it
always had, even after the founders’ departure.
Theme T2. For 9 of the 15 founders, they did not plan for the succession until it
was thrust upon them by illness, old age, or by their family. In one case, the founder’s
two sons had to get in the founder’s face about starting the process as they did not want to
be in a bad tax situation if their father should die without having a plan in place. A
daughter and son of one founder complained to him that they did not want him to die at
his desk. In one succession, it was the death of one of the co-founders that suddenly
caused the remaining founders to realize their own mortality and started them to plan for
the succession. For another founder, a skiing accident caused him to start the transition of
leadership to his son. Finally, one founder decided that it was time to retire before he
could not get out of his chair anymore.
Theme T3. In only 3 out of the 15 organizations did the founders hold less than a
majority equity position in the firm. Eight of the successors reported that the founders
acted without regard to the advice of others. Several of the successors complained that
the founder’s behaviors undercut their authority during the succession process. As a
result, the founder’s actions caused the succession processed to be suspended, started
again, and sometimes to be reversed. In one extreme case, the succession process took 20
years to complete.
Theme T4. Normally during the succession event, a founder will transfer
authority and leadership to the successor. Given that 12 out of the 15 founders had a
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controlling equity position in the organizations, they were able to set the time and
circumstances of their retirement. While talking to the successors, 7 of them expressed
that they were not inclined to confront the founder. Many of the successors indicated that
they wished they had been firmer in the timing and how the succession process took
place. For one successor, it was simply allowing the founder to have one last big deal
before he retired, which turned out badly for the organization. For another successor, it
was allowing the founder to drag out the succession over many years, which kept the
successor in a state of limbo for a long time. For one successor, she could not bring
herself to confront the founder to really start the process as her family never took her
seriously. In one succession where the son of the founder was passed over, the new leader
did not want to “rock the boat” and undo many decisions the son had done before the
succession event. Lastly, one successor waited until several months after the succession
had completed before removing several employees that the founder had been carrying on
the payroll despite low performance reviews.
Theme T5. In many of the organizations interviewed for this research, the
founder was the sole employee in the beginning and their name is also in the business
name. For seven of the organizations, the founders had a high level of self-identification
with the business; it was felt that the founder was the reason the business existed. One of
the founders was the lead provider of the service for the organization for many years and
personally held the state credentials that allowed the organization to operate. Another
founder was prominent in his industry to the point of being the president of the trade
association; it was not until a health scare that he considered divesting from the business.
Still another founder felt it was his or her personal responsibility to the community to
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keep the commercial activity going in the community and to not let it die during hard
economic times. Lastly, one successor felt that for many years she would have to use the
founder’s reputation in her industry in order to draw business to her firm.
Theme T6. Four of the successors indicated that the founder put off the day of
succession because he or she treated the organization as his or her hobby. One of the
successors discussed how the founder treated the organization as his personal sandbox to
play in and that even after the succession had completed, the founder was still coming
into the office. Another successor spoke about how the founder was still trying to make
deals and would not give up the corner office even though he was no longer running the
day-to-day operations. For one of the founders, he had no other hobbies and he was
constantly involved with running the business; his daughter recalled how as a young girl,
he would bring her along on weekends and taught her how to do building inspections in
the form of a game. Lastly, one successor indicated that the business consumed so much
of the founder’s life that even during family events and meals the two of them were
talking about the firm.
Comparison Between Model and Interviews Responses
There are three main contingency components in Rubenson and Gupta‘s
Contingency Model of The Initial Succession (1996): Are the founders skills aligned with
the needs of the organization, can the founder adapt to changes in the organization, and
can the founder impede succession? Skill alignment consists of three sub-factors: the size
of the firm, the growth rate of the firm from its inception, and the degree of product
proliferation. Founder adaptability has four sub factors: the level of education of the
founder, the founder’s general management experience, the breadth of functional
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experience and the amount of industry experience. Lastly the ability of the founder to
impede succession has five sub factors: dispersion of ownership for the firm, the
percentage of inside board members, a policy of promotion from within, the degree to
which the founder’s family dominates the culture of the organization, and finally the
amount of environmental turbulence.
Skill Alignment. It has been reported in the literature by multiple authors (Davila,
2005; Greiner, 1998; Mintzberg, 1973) that the skill set of an entrepreneur is not the same
skill set as that of a general manager. It is often during the stages of growth for an
organization that the founder finds himself or herself under stress to meet the new needs
of the organization that they are not naturally gifted to provide. In the case of founders of
smaller sized organizations, in the beginning they find themselves performing all the
functional aspects of the organization. Two sub-factors for skill alignment are the overall
size of the organization and its rate of growth.
For many of the founders, their organization was both their vocation and their
hobby. To this end, the founders controlled the organization so that their skill set was
always an asset to the organization. Thirteen out of the 15 successors felt that neither the
size of the organization nor the growth rate were in anyway a factor in precipitating the
succession event. Even with varying economic conditions, the founders were managing
the size of their firms in terms of their ability to oversee organizational operations. All 15
of the founders started their organizations by utilizing their specific skill set as the central
way to generate revenue for the firm. Only 2 of the interviewed successors indicated that
the skill set of the founder was not well aligned with the organization at the time of
succession.
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Research subject S8 reported that his father stayed focused on the preparation and
acquisition of the food for their restaurants while leaving the other aspects of the business
to others. As a result of this narrow focus, when the restaurants grew in both locations
and employee count, the founder was unprepared to deal with general management
issues. Only research subject S13 reported that his organization had a strategic goal of
high growth and it was this same company that decided to retire the founder when the
growth goal was not met. All of the other organizations were conservative in their
expansion goals or were allowing the organization to grow or to shrink in response to
prevailing economic conditions.
Combining the results of interview questions 8, 9, 10, and 11 indicates that overall
growth was not a determining factor for founder tenure in all but one of the organizations.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated a negative association for both organizational size
and a firm’s growth rate against the length of the tenure for the founder. In this research
study, no association could be found between the length of a founder’s tenure and the size
of the organization or the growth of the organization.
The third component of skill set alignment is the proliferation of the firm’s
product or services. Of the 15 organizations, 3 successors indicated that there had been no
change in their product or service offerings. For the no change founders, one organization
was in construction, one was in real estate, and the last one was in computer sales. Each
of these founders played a central role in their organization’s revenue generation until the
point of succession. There were 10 of the successors who used terms such as radical,
significant, and greatly expanded to describe the change their organizations had for their
product and service offerings.
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For the 10 organizations that had significant proliferation of their product line,
several of the successors reported that their organizations were for the most part simply
keeping up with regulatory or technology changes for their industry. According to the
successors, the expansion of their offerings was a natural consequence of the company’s
growth over time. Research subject S4 described the founder as being very proactive in
his learning about new technologies and possible changes in what their organization
offered. Due to the attitude of many of the founders to treat their organizations as their
personal hobby, none were unaffected by changes or expansions in their organizations
products.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated a negative association between the
proliferation of the organization product line and the length of the tenure for the founder.
In this research study, no association could be found between the length of a founder’s
tenure and the proliferation of the organization's product line.
Combining the three sub factors of firm size, organizational growth rate, and
product proliferation towards the alignment of the founder’s skills to the needs of the
organization, the researcher has determined that this component of the Contingency
Model for the Initial Succession does not apply to small organizations. During the
interview process, it became clear that the founders purposefully controlled the
organization so that they could always meet the needs of the organization.
Founder Adaptability. The second major area of the model deals with the ability
of the founder to adapt to a changing organization. Rubenson and Gupta (1996) believed
that during the growth phase of an organization the organization would require the CEO
to perform in different roles than at the inception of the organization.
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The amount of formal education that a founder has can equip them for new or
unexpected events in the life of their organization. Research subject S3’s view on
education was:
Because it opens your world to the different dynamics possible in transition
planning, and multiple ways to operate a business, with and without participation.
Most small businesses that don’t have that level of formal education only see it
one way, show up to work every day and they don’t know the number of ways to
skin this cat. But unless you’re in that education stream, you’re not exposed to
that layered, incremental growth in a specific subject, and business is no different.
(S3, personal communication, April 25, 2012)
The range of education encountered during the interviews was from a high school
diploma to post graduate studies; on average, the founders held a bachelors degree. In
only one case did the successor believe that the founder’s lack of formal education lead to
the need for succession. In all the other organizations, successors indicated that the
founder learned everything they needed to know as they ran the business. The longest
founder tenure of the sample population held a bachelors degree while one of the high
school diploma founders had tenure of 50 years. Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated a
positive association between the formal educational level achieved by the founder and his
or her length of the tenure. In this research study, no association could be found between
the length of a founder’s tenure and his or her educational level.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated that as the organization transitioned from
the startup phase into a mature company, the founder would have to adapt his or her
behavior from that of an entrepreneur to that of a general manager. Many of the
successors related that the founder started the current organization after having been
employed for many years in a similar organization. With an average of 30 years of
general management experience, most of the successors felt that the founders had good
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general management skills and that this was not a precipitating factor in the succession
process.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated that for founders who were younger than
55 years of age, a positive association would be found between the number of years of
general management and their length of the tenure. In this research study, the average age
of the founder at the inception of their organization was 41 years old and the average
tenure of the founder was slightly more than 25 years. Beckhard and Dyer (1983) wrote
that the average tenure of a founder is approximately 24 years. In this research study, a
positive association was found between the number of years of general management
experience and the length of a founder’s tenure.
As an organization expands in both head count and sales revenue, the number of
unique tasks or functional experiences grows as well. Rubenson and Gupta (1996)
articulated that a lack of diversity in the founder’s functional experience could lead to the
need for succession:
Thus, a lack of functional diversity would seem to be a particular weakness in a
founder who does not yet have a fully developed management team to help
identify functional weaknesses in the process and bring balance to their use of
resources. Conversely, founders with considerable functional diversity should
have heightened awareness of, and respect for, all functions, an attribute that
would permit the entrepreneur to more readily shift resources as weaknesses in
the process are identified (p. 28).
In all but two of the organizations interviewed, the successors told how the
founder had done everything in the organization as it had grown. Whether it was washing
dishes in the restaurant, packing boxes in the warehouse, or balancing the books the
founders at one point or another performed all the functions in the organization. Three of
the founders had risen through the ranks of another similar organization and so had
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experienced the broad range of functional experiences twice. Only 1 of the 15 successors
felt that the founder’s lack of functional experience contributed to succession of the
founder. All the other successors felt that due to the manageable size of the organization,
the founders had sufficiently diverse functional experiences and it was therefore not a
factor in the succession.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated a positive association between the
proliferation of the organization's product line and the length of the tenure for the
founder. In this research study, no association could be found between the length of a
founder’s tenure and the proliferation of the organization's product line.
In all but one of the interviews, the successors considered the founders to be
experts in their fields. Some of the founders were active in their trade associations and
one was even the president of his trade association. For many of the founders, their
organization was also their hobby and as such, they kept a watchful eye on industry
changes. Research subject S4 gave a typical answer when she spoke of how the founder
acquired triple the amount of training that was necessary for his organization. Rubenson
and Gupta (1996) felt that the more industry experience a founder had the more likely the
organization would thrive:
Clearly, prior industry familiarity suggest that a founder will enjoy longer tenure
since he or she will be better able to understand and adapt to the needs of the new
business, increasing the likelihood that it will develop successfully; i.e., the
business is less likely to fail (p. 29).
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated a positive association between the founder’s
length of tenure and the amount of relevant familiarity within the organizations industry;
the interviews in this research study confirmed the positive association.
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The second phase of the Contingency Model of the Initial Succession dealt with
the ability of the founder to adapt to the changing needs of the organization. Three out of
the four sub factors in this phase aligned with the propositions Rubenson and Gupta
(1996) made about the need for a succession in the organization.
Impeding Succession. The third and final phase of Rubenson and Gupta (1996)
model dealt with the ability of the founder to impede the succession. For this third phase,
there are five sub factors: the dispersion of ownership, the percentage of insiders on the
board of directors, a policy of promotion from within, a family dominated culture, and
finally the amount of environment turbulence.
In the sample population for this study, only 3 of the founders possessed less than
a controlling interest in the organization. The average percentage ownership for the entire
sample population was 74%. During the course of the interviews, 14 of the successors
indicated that the founders were in control of the timing of the initial succession.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated a positive association between the founder’s
length of tenure and the degree of ownership by the founder; in this study, this positive
association was confirmed.
Kerr and Werther (2008) suggested that in recent years the role of the board of
directors has become much more participative in nature due to more vocal stockholders
who are much more likely to hold the board responsible. In previous years it was more
common to have either a weak or non-participative board that was reluctant to intervene
in the case of a poorly performing CEO due to their allegiance to a CEO that was active
in their election to the board (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Nelson, 2003). Due to the majority
shareholder position of the founders in this study’s sample population, all but one of the
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founders could ignore the recommendations of the board. Many of the successors
reported that the founders did in fact ignore the advice from the board. Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) postulated a negative association between the founder’s length of tenure
and the number of outsider board of director members. In all but one of the organizations
in this research study, the majority of board members were insiders that either worked for
the organization or who were related to the founder; as a result there was a negative
association between the percentage of outsider board members and tenure of the
founders.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) observed, “Thus, to the degree that the founder
avoids bringing in outside managers, the firm develops more slowly and the founder
correctly observes that there is no one prepared to take over leadership” (p. 30). As was
noted earlier in this study, 9 out of the 15 organizations had policies of promoting people
from within the organization when positions were vacated. Several of the successors
openly admitted that their role as the next leader was due in large part to nepotism. For
several of the successors they reported that they had jobs outside of the founder’s
organization before joining and thus had independent training which they felt help them
to be qualified for the role of successor. Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated a positive
association between a policy of promotion from within the organization and the founder’s
length of tenure. In the sample population for this research study, there was a weak
positive association between a policy of promotion from within the organization and the
founder’s length of tenure.
Schein (1983) indicated that a founder could imply a negative attitude towards
non-family managers with their expressed loyalty to family members. When this is
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combined with a belief from the founder that their children are inadequate for the CEO
position, all possible succession candidates are eliminated (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996).
For this study, 14 of the 15 successors interviewed indicated that the founder’s family
played a significant role in the organization. Ten out of the 15 successors were family
members. Two of the 5 non-family member successors indicated that the founders had
first chosen their son to take control of the organization but once the succession started,
they changed their minds. Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated a positive association
between the founder’s length of tenure and degree to which the founder’s family
dominated the culture of the organization. A positive association was indeed observed in
the course of this research study.
During periods of economic calm, a founder might be able to make large mistakes
that go unnoticed or that can be ignored (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996). During periods of
large economic upheavals, the founder can be under considerable pressure to pass the
torch to new leadership and innovative practices. Eleven of the 15 successors described
their industries as experiencing substantial turbulence prior to the start of the succession
process. Some of them described as the turbulence as the worst they had seen in decades.
Despite the bad economic conditions, several of the successors said that the founders in
fact thrived on the turbulence and saw it as a challenge to overcome. Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) postulated a negative association between the founder’s length of tenure
and degree of industry turbulence. In this research study, no negative association could be
found between the length of a founder’s tenure and the degree of industry turbulence.
There might even be a basis for a slight positive association.
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The third phase of the Contingency Model of the Initial Succession dealt with the
ability of the founder to impede the succession. Three out of the five sub-factors in this
final phase were firmly aligned with the predictions Rubenson and Gupta (1996) made
about their model. One prediction about a sub-factor was observed to be weakly reversed
and another was weakly aligned. Thus, the final phase of the model seemed to have weak
explanatory value.
Did the Founders Plan for Succession
Only 40% of the founders had a plan in place for succession before the succession
actually started. In the opinions of the successors, the founders often let the process of
handing over control of the organization to them in a non-methodical manner. Of those
founders who did plan the succession process, the successors were very pleased with the
resulting process. In most cases, the founder’s primary concern for the succession process
was how to extract their equity position in the organization in the most profitable way
possible. Only 4 out of 15 successors related that the founder trained them to take over
the responsibilities of the organization before their formal transition to being the new
leader.
How Might the Succession Process Been Improved
When asked how the successors would have changed the succession process, the
majority of them would have liked to have had a detailed succession plan with a checklist
for completion. It was often the lament of the successors that the succession process took
too long and no firm date was set for the official transfer of power. Four of the successors
related that the founder’s vagueness as to when the successor was in charge often
confused subordinates and undermined the confidence of the organization in the
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successor. In the case where the successor was a family member, several of the founders
reversed the decisions of the successors even after granting them authority to make those
decisions.
Themes Related to Research Question and Interview Questions
In addition to discovering if the Contingency Model of the Initial Succession
(Rubenson & Gupta, 1996) was applicable to smaller organizations, this research also
sought to discover other factors that might have affected the decision to go forward with
the succession event. In the course of the 15 hours of interviews, several themes arose:
1. Founders were not thinking in terms of their legacy but were instead mostly
concerned with how to cash out.
2. Founders did not plan for the succession until it was thrust upon them by illness,
old age, or by their family.
3. Founders did whatever they wanted because they owned the majority shares.
4. Successors were not inclined to confront the founder.
5. Founders had a high level of self-identification with the business. They felt that
they were the business.
6. Founders hung onto the organization because it was their hobby.
Cashing Out. In many cases, founders were thinking neither in terms of their
legacy nor of the continuation of the firm after their departure. When first asked about the
founder succession, many of the successors immediately started recounting how the
founder was cashing out their equity positions. In fact, several of the successors who
were in the founder’s family did not think of themselves as really being in charge until
they had inherited the founder’s equity position. When the subject of planning for the
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succession became apparent, many of the founders were only thinking in terms of how to
cash out of the business and not building an organization that would thrive once they left.
Many of the successors commented on how they had wished the founder would
have prepared them more for the role of CEO. One successor went so far as to say that he
had been “thrown to the wolves.” For those founders who passed the leadership role to an
offspring, the successors were expected to have absorbed by osmosis the knowledge and
skills required to run the business.
Of those successors who said that they had a definite plan and that the plan had
been executed well, they talked about the number of years that they had prepared
themselves for the role. The successors indicated that they had become familiar with the
many aspects of the business. One successor felt that it had been a good thing that the
business had suffered a crisis during this preparatory time as it gave the founder and him
a chance to work through the crisis together; the successor said it boosted his confidence
greatly.
The day will never come. When the successors were asked about the planning
that went into their becoming the next leader in the organization, they often replied that
little to no planning had been done. The only reason that a succession happened at all in
these cases was because the founder had suffered some sort of health scare or a family
member strongly urged them to retire. A health scare had caused several of the founders
to rethink their long-term plans for their life. One founder had a snow skiing accident,
one firm had one of the co-founders die, and another founder starting having leg and back
problems. In those moments of doubt about their future, family members were often the
final straw that tipped the founder towards the process of succession. Ironically, the
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successors reported that once the founders did retire they did not look back with regret on
the decision to retire. Many of the successors noted that the transition process took far
longer than they had anticipated and would have preferred a shorter time span. It was as
if the founders were paying lip service to the concept of succession but were not really
that serious in the pursuit of completing it.
Ownership equals power. In several of the interviews, the successors mentioned
that the founders simply did as they pleased. They did whatever they wanted because
they owned the majority shares. Only one of the companies interviewed had a board of
directors who had a majority of its members that would be considered as outsiders and it
was only this organization that started the succession due to poor performance by the
founder. In the majority of the cases when the board would make recommendations that
ran contrary to the wishes of the founder, the founder would just ignore them.
During the course of the interviews, several of the successors who were known to
the organization as the heir apparent noted that without a clear transition plan that
included a time table and milestones for the succession the organization was often left in
a state of confusion as to who was responsible for what. The successors laid the cause for
this confusion squarely at the feet of the founders. Many of the founders never gave a
clear message to the organization that the successor was the new leader and in many
cases, the founders would intervene in day-to-day operations by reversing previously
made decisions. As a result, an attitude of disrespect by the employees towards the
successor was often inadvertently cultivated by the founder. This use of power to delay or
reverse the succession process often left the successor in a power vacuum.
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Successor timidity. In many of the interviews, the successor indicated that during
the succession process they were inclined not to confront the founder on issues of the
transfer of power and a timeline for the completion of the succession. They did not want
to assert themselves until they were firmly in control. This often meant that successors
left poor performing employees in place until well after the founder was no longer
involved in the day-to-day operations of the firm. Once the successors felt safely in
charge, they talked about “cleaning house” as a process of sweeping away employees the
founder had kept on the payroll despite their need for replacement.
One successor discussed how the founder’s son had made several changes to the
physically layout of the office space in the building. While the new layout was disliked
by most of the employees and was considered by the successor as a hindrance to the
performance of the organization, he is delaying any corrections until the ESOP buyout of
the founder is complete. The high rate of timidity in confronting the founder could be
attributed to family dynamics in 10 out of the 15 organizations interviewed.
Merged identities. Many of the successor indicated that the founders had a high
level of self-identification with the business; the founders felt that they were the business.
Rubenson & Gupta (1996) indicated that the founder can have great difficulty in letting
go of their organization, “Most corporate leaders equate relinquishing organizational
control with death — an ending — while others in the firm look forward to a new era —
a beginning” (p. 21). Several of the founders had their surnames in the name of the
organization. The successors that were the children of the founders related that the
founders were so consumed with their organizations that they could rarely attend a family
occasion without talking about the business. For all of the founders, it was their personal
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skills that were used to start their organizations and for many years the sole source of
revenue.
It is their hobby. For many of the founders, their work in the organization they
created was very enjoyable. For several of the founders, running their company was a
second career in which they could now exercise control and direction. Several of the
successors related how the founders treated the organization as their hobby. One
successor said that the challenge of running the business was the reason that the founder
got up in the morning. For most of the founders, they would have continued to work
indefinitely if they could have. It was only if and when their passion or their health
waned that the founders even considered passing the company on to someone else. Due
the equity positions, of all but two of the founders were able to control the organization
such that it never out grew their ability to control it. For several of the founders, it was
only after the urging of their family members that the founders considered giving up their
hobby.
Conclusion
In this study three research questions were explored: Is the Contingency Model of
the Initial Succession proposed by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) transferable to
organizations of smaller size and lower revenues, were the founders of small sized
organizations planning for their eventual succession, and what other factors came into
play beyond those outlined by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) during the succession
process? This chapter reviewed the results of gathering and analyzing the answers to
these three research questions. New data was gathered from the unstructured question
section of the interview process and were categorized into several new themes.
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After speaking with 15 different successors in many unrelated fields of business
based on the Rubenson and Gupta (1996) Contingency Model of the Initial Succession,
only 3 of the 12 sub-factors in the model scored higher than 5 out of 10 by the successors
and thus to have had a significant influence in precipitating the succession event: The
three sub-factors with significant influence were founder equity, a policy of promotion
from within, and the influence of the family. Due to the equity position of the majority of
the founders, they were able to set the pace and terms of their succession as they saw fit.
In addition, due to the founders’ ownership position, family members were often
employed by the organization. The successors attributed the policy of promotion from
within as the reason that they were chosen for the new leadership role as the founder
exited their CEO positions. Finally, it was most often at the urging of family members
that many of the founders put the succession process into motion.
Only 40% of the founders planned for their eventual succession. Of those
founders who did plan for succession, most did not have a formal plan but had only
acknowledged that a succession was needed. As a result, most of the 15 successors
indicated that if they had an opportunity to go back and change the succession they would
have had a firm timeline for the succession process, a detailed list of processes to take
place, and the public support of the founder during the process.
Lastly, this study sought out additional factors that might have had an influence of
the pacing of or the precipitation of the succession event. Six different themes arose
during the course of the study:
1. Founders were not thinking in terms of legacy. They were only thinking in terms
of how to cash out of the business.
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2. They did not plan for the succession until it was thrust upon them by illness, old
age, or by their family.
3. Founders did whatever they wanted because they owned the majority shares.
4. Successors were not inclined to confront the founder.
5. Founders had a high level of self-identification with the business. They felt that
they were the business.
6. Founders hung onto the organization because it was their hobby.
All six of these themes affected the succession event for the 15 firms in this study in
either the timing of the succession or in the steps that took place to complete it.
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Chapter Five: Results
In this chapter the researcher will present the findings of the study, discuss the
implications of results of the study as well as recommendations for founders, successors,
and board members, discuss the possible limitations of the study, and finally give
recommendations for further research on founder successions.
Discussion of Research Questions
The primary purpose of this study was to see if the Contingency Model of the
Initial Succession was applicable to a different target population, namely small sized
organizations. The researcher used a combination of structured and unstructured question
during interviews of 15 CEO’s about the succession process from the founder to the next
organizational leader to answer the following research questions.
1) Is the contingency model of The Initial Succession proposed by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) transferable to organizations of smaller size and lower revenues?
2) Were the founders of small sized organizations planning for their eventual
succession?
3) What other factors came into play beyond those outlined by Rubenson and Gupta
(1996) during the succession process?
There were 14 face to face interviews with the next organizational leader of the
companies in the study and one that was done via a telephone conversation. Each of the
interviews were conducted at the companies location at a date and time of the leaders
choosing. During the interviews the researcher encouraged the interviewees to express
what they felt were the salient aspects of the founder transition.
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Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) succession model starts with assumption that
neither the organization nor the founder are in a static state. Over time the needs of the
organization will change as it either grows or shrinks. The environment of the industry
through technology changes, turbulence, or new regulations will place new demands on
the founder as time goes by. Founders cannot stay young forever and they have their
limits in how much they can change and grow. The interaction of these two dynamics
according to Rubenson and Gupta (1996) can lead to the succession of the founder.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) also tell us that the first two contingences, change in the
organization and the ability of the founder to adapt to a changing organization, can be
objective evaluations as to the need for succession while the third contingency, the ability
to impede the succession, can be emotional and override the first two contingencies.
The changing needs of the organization. In the first contingency, the changing
needs of the organization, there are three sub-factors that can be summarized as skill
alignment between the founder and the organization. In many small organizations the
founder is the first employee and the number of employees will stay less than 10
employees for several years. As the first employee the founder is performing most if not
all of the services that the organization offers. As a result, organizational growth is
dependent on the founder’s ability to perform these tasks. With only a handful of
employees the size of the organization and its growth rate is directly related to founder’s
desire or ability to delegate tasks. Founders start a business because it is something they
enjoy doing or it is something they feel they can excel at.
This enjoyment of performing the tasks is the basis of theme T6, namely that
founders treat their organization as their personal hobby. With the attitude of a hobby,
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founders will actively pursue new knowledge in order to stay abreast of the latest trends
in the industry. Unfortunately, growing their organization will mean that a founder
would have to give up their hobby for the less attractive tasks of general management. As
a result, most founders only allow their organizations to grow at a slow pace which is
often at the same pace as the general economy grows or contracts. In this study many of
the successors made comments that their revenue streams and employee counts closely
matched the prevailing economic conditions.
In many cases the industry that an organization exists in will change due to
technology or new regulations. These changes in the industry often spur the organization
to offer new products or at the very least to expand the current product line. Founders
will only stay up with changes in their field that they felt comfortable in. Often it is only
at the urging of the successor that the product offerings for an organization are changed
or expanded. In speaking to several of the successors, the product expansion was either
instigated by them or was heavily encouraged by them. Usually it was not the founder
who sees the need for new products or services but rather it is the successor who sees the
need to expand beyond the founder’s comfort zone. This is most often the case when the
successor is a family member.
In the course of this research study it has become apparent that due to the
overwhelming ownership position of the founders they are able to control the growth,
size, and complexity of their organization so that it was always manageable. This result
would seem to confirm Davil’s (2005) position that the personal characteristics of
founders are ill-suited for the management of larger organizations. Founders run their
organizations as they see fit. It is also very typical behavior for a founder to treat the
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organization as their personal property, even when the employee count is in the hundreds.
It is not uncommon for founders to lose sight of the fact that there are other stakeholders
in the organization besides themselves. If a founder’s belief is that slow and steady was
preferable to radical change then no large risks will be taken. Especially with founders
that lead an organization for over 30 years, phrases such as steady Eddie are often applied
to them. Which is to say that long tenured founders often adopt a conservative attitude
about their business.
The ability of the founder to adapt. Rubenson and Gupta’s second contingency,
the ability of the founder to adapt, has four sub-factors: education, functional
experiences, general management experience, and industry familiarity. As was noted
earlier in this paper the founder’s ability to control the organization limits their need to
adapt. Most founders intentionally start their organizations because they feel that they are
capable of running them. Learning on the job is a prerequisite for most founders. For
many founders, having an advanced degree gives them very little advantage in starting
and running a new business. Learning on the job is often the only education a founder
receives in the running of their organization. There are many a multi-millionaire founders
who only have a high school diploma. Many of the successors in this study attributed the
success of the founders to their passion for the organization rather than a formal
education.
As was mentioned earlier all the founders in this study started off performing all
the functions of the organization from the beginning. For some founders, their
organization is a second career. Having spent a decade or two working their way up
through a previous organization a founders are often well equipped to handle the
118

challenges of their new organization. Rubenson and Gupta (1996) postulated that having
a lack of diverse functional experiences would limit the ability of the founders to adapt.
Given that Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) sample population was exclusively Fortune
1000 companies, it would seem reasonable that the size of the organizations would have
prevented their founders from knowing the details of all the departments in their
organizations. The familiarity of the small sized organizational founder with the inner
workings of their own companies combined with their previous work experiences
substantially enhances their ability to adapt.
As an organization grows so does the need for general management skills.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) proposed that for founders who were younger than 55 years
of age, they might have their tenures cut short due to a lack of general management
skills. Beckhard and Dyer (1983) inform us that the average number of years that a
founder runs a business is approximately 24 years. With the ownership position firmly in
the control of founders of small organizations, the founder often experiences much longer
tenure than average. Additionally, founders of small sized organizations are for the most
part exempted from the demands of general management as they are much closer to the
day to day operations of the organization. Although the results of this sub-factor in this
study appear to agree with Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) postulation, founders will
control the size and complexity of the organization such that they never have a problem
managing the organization. By intentionally keeping the organization small this genre of
founder is able to utilize more of their entrepreneurial skills and thus being able to avoid
having to transition into a full-fledged general manager. Davila (2005) tells us that a CEO
might be replaced due to their inability to enable formal order to the organization. Very
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often the successor will have superior management skills to that of the founder and it is
the successor who then brings structure and order to the organization.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) said that a lack of industry familiarity could also
contribute to the need for a founder’s succession. Many small organizational founders
stay involved in the customer facing aspects of their organizations. Whether it was from
participating in sales or in the production of the services offered, founders tend to stay in
constant contact with changes and trends in their respective industries. As was noted in
theme T6, the organization was the founder’s hobby. For the founders the services or
products that the organization provides are of keen interest to them. As a result of this
keen interest it is not uncommon for founders to participate in industry functions such as
trade associations, standards bodies, or technical forums. Successful founders often
become experts and well known leaders in their respective fields. Many successors use
the established reputation of the founder as way to continue the growth sales for the
organization after the initial leadership transition.
The ability of the founder to impede the succession. In Rubenson and Gupta’s
(1996) model of the Initial Succession the authors describe how the ability of the founder
to impede the succession can over-ride the need for it. The founder’s ability to impede
was elaborated in five sub-factors: how dispersed the ownership was, the percentage of
inside board members, whether or not a policy of promotion from within existed, how
much the founder’s family dominated the culture of the organization, and lastly the
amount of environmental turbulence.
For the majority of small organization founders their equity positions allow them
to completely control the succession process. Smaller organizations require less
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capitalization than larger ones. Founders of smaller organizations can often self fund and
therefore reduce their dependency on outside investors. If there are other owners in
smaller organizations it is often the founder’s family members who hold the remaining
equity positions. With majority ownership founders can exercise uninhibited control over
their organizations.
Another aspect of the control this genre of founders expresses is the way in which
they select the members for the board of directors. Small sized organizational founders
will often fill their boards with family members, friends or employees of the
organization. Due to a lack of formal structure in most small organizations founders often
create a board of advisors rather than a formal board that they would then be answerable
to. As was noted in theme T3, founders often did as they pleased rather than heed the
advice from the board. As a result, the boards of these smaller organizations are often
ineffectual at best. The only time that a founder cannot ignore the board is when there are
outside investors such that the founder does not own a majority of the equity.
This study confirmed Kansikas and Kuhmonen (2008) assertion that in smaller
sized organizations founders often enlist family members to work in the organization.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) reasoned that founders often surround themselves with
people that support them in their ideas and decisions. Founders who are willing to
tolerate outside opinions and ideas are thus more likely to listen to others about the need
for changes in leadership. Having a policy of promotion from within for small
organizations may have more to do a lack of resources than a purposeful decision to
develop inside talent. Hiring an outside search organization can cost as much as 30% of
the executives annual salary. If the founder has family members in the firm they are often
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working for lower wages than an outside executive would demand. For many founders of
small organizations, the search for outside talent could just be too high a price to pay
given their generally conservative business nature.
Rubenson and Gupta (1996) reasoned that there were two extremes of a spectrum
that a founder might inhabit. The first being that a founder had strong patriarchal
tendencies and as such would have given key management positions to their family
members as they would be considered to have more invested in the organization than
outsiders. The other extreme was that founders would not be interested in building an
organization for their children and as such would be more open to choosing the best
successor whether it was a family member or not. Due to normally long hours that a
founder puts into starting a business, they often have to sacrifice time with their family
for business priorities. It is quite common for the founder’s children to have no interest
in working in the family business. As a result founders may often have to turn to trusted
employees to take the new role of leadership.
In this study the successors reported that their organizations were heavily
influenced by family members in 14 out of 15 cases. Despite this high result the longevity
of the founder’s tenure was not attributed by the successors to the founder using their
head of the family status to delay their succession. Instead the founders were more often
than not using their position to influence a family member to be the next organizational
leader. In many cases the founder’s first choice did not work out and another family
member was offered the leadership position instead. What was of greater influence in the
succession was not the founder trying to use their family position to delay but rather the
children or spouse of the founder asking them to step down.
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Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) final contingency dealt with environment
turbulence. Many founders thrive on turbulence, they see it as more of an opportunity
than a threat. Because of the smaller size of the organizations in this study the founders
were regularly involved in the day to day operations. It was often their passion for the
operation of the business that gave them satisfaction when they overcame obstacles. For
the founders industry turbulence was a welcome challenge as it provided opportunities
for them to excel. During the interviews, several of the successors indicated that at the
time of succession their industries were experiencing substantial turbulence and yet this
turbulence had little to no effect on the succession.
Only 6 of the 12 sub-factors in the model for the initial succession were
confirmed in the sample population of this study. After interviewing 15 successors of
small organizations it is the authors conclusion that the proposed model by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) as it is currently constructed had minimal explanatory power in the target
population of this study.
Discussion of Discovered Themes
Despite high involvement of family members in the organizations in this study
many of the successors noted that the founders were more concerned with cashing out
than making sure the organization continued once they were gone. This concern with
cashing out was classified as theme T1 in the previous chapter. After many years of
running their organizations most of the founders in this study either completely owned or
at least held a majority of the equity of the organization. For several of the founders, their
way of cashing out of the organization was to create an employee stock option plan
(ESOP). Several of the successors reported that they wouldn’t feel like the real leader of
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the organization until the ESOP plan was fully funded and the founder had sold their
stock to the ESOP. Several of the founders also used the funding of the ESOP as the
trigger point for completing the succession. In other cases the founders simply
transferred ownership to a family member in exchange for cash to fund their retirement.
Many of the successors told of how the founders had spent more time working on how to
maximize their financial gain than time on making sure the succession process went well.
Many of the organization in this study incorporated the surname of the founder in
to the organizations name. This behavior of a founder naming the organization after
themselves is a normal outcome of the fact that in the beginning of these organizations
the founder is the only employee and the only one providing either the product or the
service. This finding is in line with those reported by Brown and Coverley (1999) in that
the founders considered themselves to be essential to the success of the business. As a
result of many years of operating the organization as an extension of themselves the
founders seemed to act as if they were the organization. The self identification theme was
termed theme T5 in the previous chapter. For many of the founders the act of succession
seemed like tearing a part of their body off. Several of the successors reported that their
founders never even considered retiring. With this high degree of self identification the
founders delayed even starting the succession planning as it would have meant putting an
end to a significant part of the founders life.
Due to the lack of desire for many of the founders to end their leadership role
theme T2 was identified as the succession being brought on by illness, old age, or a
family member. After decades of running their organizations it is often a family member
who finally persuades a founder to retire. For many of the founders the idea of retirement
124

never even occurred to them until they had an accident or suffered a major medical
setback. During their recovery time they involuntarily had to let go of the day to day
operation of the organization. The successors reported that it was during this recovery
time that the founders either contemplated their future or at least were now willing to
listen to the successor discuss with them their plans for retirement. One of the founders in
this study after 50 years of running their organization is still resisting the succession
process.
This behavior of control by the founders was the basis for the themes T3, T4, and
T6. Theme T3’s behavior was identified as the founder doing whatever they wanted
because they held a controlling interest in the organization. In most cases the T3 behavior
is expressed by the founder choosing the direction and strategies of the organization. But
it becomes most evident during the succession process in which they at some point have
to give up control. Due to the overwhelming equity position of most of the founders, their
day of succession is theirs to decide. Many of the founders of small organizations make
decisions with little regard to the input from board members, successors, or investors.
Founders did not feel that they are accountable to anyone except themselves. This lack of
accountability lead to some of the founders making bad business decisions that at times
endangered the life of the organization. For many of the founders the implication of the
lack of accountability is that founders often made decisions based on their instincts and at
times for their own self interests rather than the greater good of the organization. The
behavior of the founders in this study confirmed Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) concept
that a founder could delay succession because of their ownership position.
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Because of the total control of the founder to select or change the successor at any
time successors tend to take a passive position on the subject of the succession.
Confronting the founder who is delaying the succession process can cost a potential
successor their position. As was explained in chapter four, theme T4 is the behavior of
successors is to not confront the founder about the timing or conditions of the succession.
With a firm grip on the control of the organization, the successors tend to let the founder
take the lead. As a result many successors are not satisfied with the process and
generally feel unprepared for their new role as the organizational leader.
Theme T6 was the expressed behavior of the founder to hold onto their leadership
role in the organization because it was their hobby. Very few founders have outside
interests as their companies totally consume them; it becomes their best friend. For
founders letting go of their organization would mean letting go of the thing that they had
poured their lives into for many years. If the successor is a family member then it is quite
possible that the founder will feel that they still have a right to coming back into the
organization and start giving orders even after passing on the leadership role to their
child. With such a strong interest in the organization founders are very reluctant to give
up control.
Recommendations
There are three groups of individuals that the results of this research study have
implications for: the founder, the successor, and members of the board. The following
sections of this dissertation will discuss these implications and give recommendations for
improving the succession process for each of the groups.
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Founders. Rubenson and Gupta‘s model for the initial succession (1996) was
primarily based on the concept that founders at some point and time are no longer
capable of meeting the needs of the organization and therefore a founder succession is
indicated. As an organization progresses though the stages of growth, the relevancy of an
entrepreneurs skill fades and the need for the skill set of a general manager grows. It has
been reported in the literature by multiple authors (Davila, 2005; Greiner, 1998;
Mintzberg, 1973;) that the skill set of an entrepreneur is not the same skill set as that of a
general manager. It is often during the stages of growth for an organization that the
founder finds themselves under stress to meet the new needs of the organization that they
are not naturally gifted to provide.
Several recommendations for founders have come out of this study:
They need to accept that their days as CEO are numbered.
They need to decide how long they want to run the organization.
They need to not stand in the way of organizational growth.
They need to make a real succession plan.
They need to make an emergency succession plan.
They need to make a plan for the rest of their life.
They need to coach their successor
Founders need to remember that time waits for no man. They need to accept the
concept that at some point they will be handing over the company to someone else. At
some point there will come a moment when the organization would be better off in the
hands of someone else. The hand over to the next leader can either be done on their own
terms or on someone else’s. They might choose at some point in the future to sell the
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business rather than handing over the leadership role to someone new. There is also the
distinct possible that they will either expire early or be incapacitated to the point that
they are no longer able to run the business. If there is no plan in place for succession
when the founder expires then there is the possibility that the probate court will be the
one deciding who will own the business.
Decide how long the founder wants to run the company. Generally speaking
founders of small organizations have a controlling equity position and therefore do not
have to leave the organization until they want to. This can take the form of:
1. The founder setting their retirement in financial terms, as in a certain cash-out
value for their shares in the company. They might also pick a particular
revenue number for the company. Beware of setting numeric values that are
not reasonable. Have at least one other person with accounting expertise
review the founder’s financial goals to make sure they have picked an
achievable number.
2.

Set the retirement as a date on the calendar. Use this date as a point to work
backward from so that a starting point for the succession can take place. Even
if there is a financial aspect to the retirement it is highly recommended that the
founder pick a date at which they will retire even if the financial goals are not
met.

Make an actual succession plan. Rather than just giving the concept lip service,
the founder along with his management team needs to actually create one. Even if the
first one created is not a good one it will at least get the founder thinking about how to
build one that more to their liking. One way to start the process is to imagine what it
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would take for the organization to run without the founder for three months. Pretend that
the founder has been seriously injured such that they are unable to even have a coherent
conversation with their staff .
1. List of all the duties that the founder performs on a daily, weekly, monthly,
and annual basis.
2. List all of the important clients of the firm. Create a list of which clients need
to be paid attention to and which ones can be gotten to later.
3. List all of the important things that will be coming up soon and that need to
be taken care of. (contracts, client meetings, tax audits, etc.)
4. Create an ordered list of people the founder would want to run the
organization for them. These individuals need to be people that they trust to
make important financial commitments on their behalf. Just doing this one
step alone can reveal how unprepared an organization is for succession.
5. Create a checklist for the transfer of power and responsibilities to the
successor. Many authors have used the metaphor of a relay race to describe
the succession process. The runner in front is suppose speed up so that he
matches the speed of the runner in back. Once the two runners are in rhythm
the baton is passed and the runner in back slows to a stop while the runner in
front sprints away. A sudden transition of power and responsibilities creates
undue stress on the organization and the successor. It would be just like
asking the front runner in a relay race to take the baton at a dead stop and
expect them to instantly sprint down the lane. A better approach is to
gradually transfer the tasks of the CEO to the successor such that they can
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learn them in a controlled manner. Once all of the roles have been transferred
and the successor is in effect the acting CEO, then officially transfer the title
to them.
6. If possible, reduce the founder’s ownership to a minority position before the
actual date of the succession. The reduction in equity can be a part of the
funding plan for their retirement. More importantly successors face the very
real threat of a founder that might reverse themselves and re-assume the role
of CEO. Succession can take upwards of five or more years to complete and a
successor must weigh the reality of the succession taking place versus their
opportunities at other organizations. Even family members are not guaranteed
to wait an indefinite amount of time before taking over the firm.
Make an emergency succession plan. As morbid as this sounds the organization
needs to have one in place just in case the founder suddenly passes away. There is a very
real concern by family members that a sudden death would leave them in the position of
having to run the family business with little to no preparation. Only 3 in 10 organization
survive that transition from one generation to the next. Adding in the stress of suddenly
losing the founder with no preparation reduces the chances for success even more.
Make a plan for what the founder will be doing after leaving the CEO position to
someone else. Founders tend to be very energetic and driven people. It is very hard for
them to turn off their competitive nature. It would be much easier for a founder to either
start or join another organization than to simply retire. Another possibility is for the
founder to join one or more board of directors. If the founder retains a sizeable equity
position and feels that they can still contribute to the organization then they might
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choose to become the chairmen of the board of the organization. Lastly it might be that
the founder wants to simply play golf four days a week. If the founder is unable to
visualize what their retirement will look like then it will be very difficult for them to
pursue a succession plan.
Don’t stand in the way of organizational growth. As counterintuitive as this might
sound founders think of themselves as the organization. With this high degree of self
identification comes the concept of limiting the organization so that it is manageable. By
limiting the size and complexity of the organization a founder can always stay relevant.
If the organization is presented with opportunities that would can grow and expand
beyond the founder’s abilities then these should be taken as serious signals that a
succession should happen.
Founders need to coach their successors. For most of the founders in this study
there were no formal leadership development programs. The lack of leadership
development plans indicate a lack of interest by the founder in growing their businesses
beyond themselves. Founders need to plan for the next phase of the organizations life
after the so that years later the organization will be able to look back with gratitude at
their efforts rather than relief that they are finally gone. Making sure that the next leader
is properly prepared increases the organizations chances that it will thrive after the
transition.
It is also in the personal best interests of the founders to have the company
running well at their departure as this would maximize their payout upon retirement. In
most cases the next leader will not be utilizing the same skill set as the founder who often
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possess more entrepreneurial skills than general management skills. The successor will
more than likely be tasked with growing and formalizing the organization.
In many cases the founders did little to no planning for the succession. Only 40%
of the successors in this study knew of a succession plan for their organization and even
then most of the successors felt that the plan was minimalistic at best. The lack of
planning observed in this study is in line with the assertion by Carey and Ogden (2000)
that most organizations do not have a succession plan in place. For many of the founders
the organization they started is so personal to them that they do not even consider a time
in which they won’t be running it. The implication of this is that successions are often
flawed in their execution and often miss important steps due to a half hearted attempt by
the founder.
Successors. As was noted in the previous section, 60% of the time successions are
not planned for. Successors need to realized that a founder is emotionally attached to
their organization; it is their child. They have birthed it and nurtured it for many years.
Even though the founder might have started the succession process they still might not be
emotionally ready to finish it. Successors should not be surprised if the founder seems to
be mercurial in their behavior as they go through the process of letting go. Letting go of
their organization is emotionally painful.
Several recommendations for potential successors came out of this study:
Make sure the founder really intends to leave one day.
Make sure you are the successor and not the runner up.
Establish a plan for the succession even if the time for transition may be
several years in the future.
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Ask for mentorship from the founder.
Be vigilant in their monitoring of the changing needs of the organization.
Reduce the founder’s equity.
Confront the founder about succession delays.
Founders tend to very myopic concerning their organization. For them the
organization is their hobby, they live in the present and enjoy every day they come to
work. Thinking about the process of letting go will be very hard for them. Founders are
used to being introduced as the president of their organization; people give them the seat
at the head of the table. No matter what a founder may say, after 20 plus years of being
the CEO they will have become accustomed to a certain level of prestige and power. The
successor needs to assess just how likely the founder will be willing to give up their
position.
One way to assess the founder’s willingness to leave is to start asking them what
their plans are for 10 to 15 years from now. If the founder’s plans are to still be running
the company then the successor will have to decide if they want to wait that long.
Qualified successors might see that the transition process is not proceeding at a pace that
is in line with their career goals. A slow succession process combined with what Schein
(1983) calls a negative attitude towards non-family managers can contribute to an
increase in management turnover. The increased turnover might then be a reinforcement
of the founder’s belief that they are the only one left that is capable of running the
organization.
Founders have multiple ways of choosing successors. For many the assumption is
that a family member will assume control of the family business. Other founders knowing
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that their children have no passion for the business then search inside the organization for
a likely candidate. One of the down sides to having a family member take over a small
business is that the founder often makes the assumption that their children will naturally
understand the idiosyncrasies of the business without having to teach them. This lack of
training often leads to an increased level of stress for the successors. Another problem
that arises is the assumption of some family members that because they are children of
the founder the role of CEO will fall to them. The potential successor needs to make sure
that they are truly the one that the founder has chosen . Otherwise organizational strife
can ensue due to conflicting messages from the founder and from the potential
successors.
In order to reduce any confusion in the leadership transition a clearly laid out
succession plan needs to be established. A plan needs to be established even if the time
for transition may be several years in the future. The plan should include:
1. A firm timetable for the succession process. The timetable start point can be
some time in the future but the maximum length of time for the entire
transition process need to be fixed. Having a timetable with no fixed ending
point is no better than having no time table at all.
2. A detailed list of responsibilities that will be transferred to the successor. Very
often a CEO does not realize everything they do and creating a list of
everything that needs to be done can bring clarity to the situation.
3. Companywide communications by the founder that a transition is in place.
One of the worse things that can happen in an organization is to create rumors.
If the successor starts doing things that founder use to do without the founder
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publicly announcing the transition then others in the organization might not be
able to discern who is in charge and who is not.
4. Public demonstrations of the founder’s support for the successor. One of the
best things that the founder can do for the succession process to succeed is to
publically acknowledge the successor. Reducing ambiguity as to who the new
leader of the organization will be reduces the chances for the founder to
inadvertently undermining the authority of the successor.
5. An agreed upon training program between the founder and successor that
includes all the salient aspects of running the organization. If the successor is
new to the organization then they might not be familiar with all the aspects of
the organization. As was mentioned in a previous section of this paper, the
crucial timing of a relay race is to make sure that the new runner comes up to
the same speed as the current runner so that the passing of the baton is as
smooth as possible. Having a training process in place reduces the chances for
a misstep during the transition.
6. A clear definition of the founder’s role after the succession has taken place.
Without a clear definition the founder will be left in a state limbo as to their
relationship with the organization that they birthed. For some founders, they
will go onto do something else and never look back. For others they will want
to stick around in some capacity either as the chairman of the board or as a
paid consultant. Even if the founder eventually does takes on a different role
than what was defined, having something to look forward to will give them a
goal to achieve.
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With the founder’s lack of desire to relinquish control the implication for the
successor is that a founder will not see the need to train a successor to take over their
position. Due to this lack of planning successors were often unprepared to handle the
new responsibilities of running the organization.
Because of a founder’s natural desire to control their organization a successor
needs to be vigilant in their monitoring of the changing needs of the organization. In the
interests of stability and risk reduction a founder might not pursue opportunities that
would require the organization to grow. The successor may suggest to the founder that
these missed opportunities might be indications that a change in leadership could be
needed if the organization is to continue to thrive.
Due to the power of family members to help motivate the founder to retire it
would in the best interests of the successor to, if possible, involve them in the succession
process. This research has indicated that family members were often the final factor in a
founder’s decision to pass the baton to the next leader of the organization. Family
members who are succession candidates need to know that unless the founder reduces
their equity position to less than a controlling interest their succession will be at the whim
of the founder. Part of the succession process should be that the founder’s equity position
falls below 50% early in the process. Having a minority ownership position will insure
that the founder is unable to back out of the succession process at the last moment or
have the ability stall it.
If the founder introduces delays in implementing the succession then the
successor needs to confront them about it. It is normal for a founder to hesitant about
letting go of their organization. Unfortunately for the successor, founders often have
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controlling ownership in their organization and they are used to doing things as they see
fit. Silence on the part of management about succession delays can lead to a founder over
staying their usefulness and possibly causing harm to the organization. The successor
needs to make sure that the founder understands how their decision to delay the
leadership transfer can cause employee confusion, possible morale issues, and that the
successor might seek other opportunities in other organizations. There are risks in
confronting the founder about delays but there are also risks to the organization if the
transfer doesn’t happen in a timely manner.
Founders often cannot conceive of what they would be doing after retiring from
the CEO position. As a motivator for the founder, the successor should define as part of
the succession process what the new role would be for the founder. For many of the
founders in this study they simply cashed some portion of their equity out and retired.
Some of the founders stayed involved with the business in a limited role, while others
joined the board of directors as the chairman. Helping the founder visualize what their
new life will be like could in some cases remove the last obstacle for the succession to
proceed.
Board Members. Most founders in this study were characterized as strong willed
and charismatic. The reason many board members had their positions was more often due
to the founder’s influences than the representation of an investor. Board members in these
positions naturally felt some obligation to the founder, but their primary responsibility is
to the organization. Additionally the equity position of most of the founders in this study
reduced the role of many board members to that of advisors.
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Naveen (2006) tells us that one of the primary responsibilities of the founder and
board of directors is the selection of a successor that aligns with the strategic direction of
the organization and who can keep the organization moving forward after succession.
One recommendation for board members would be to bring up the concept of successor
selection years before it is needed. An early discussion about succession would allow the
adequate training of the successor before the process is needed.
The board members for an organization are in a unique position to detect the
changing needs of the organization due to their outside perspective. It is one of the
primary responsibilities of the current CEO and board of directors to search for
succession candidates. When it comes to succession a board member can serve both the
founder who gave them their position and also the organization by making sure that the
transition happens at the appropriate time and is well planned. Considering that the
founders often have a controlling interest in their organization and have no legal
obligation to obey the board, members of the board would do well to work with the
founder to find a good candidate for the succession long before there is a need for one.
Many of the founders in this study expected to pass the business onto their children. This
author recommends that board members make sure that the heirs are ready for the job.
Limitations of the Study
According to census data prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce (2009)
the total number of firms in the United States that are classified as small business
employers is 5,767,306. A small employer, according to the same report by the U.S.
Department of Commerce (2009) , is one with less than 500 employees. Given that the
approximate life span of a business is 24 years (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983), the number of
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founder transitions in the United States each year is quite large. This research project was
limited because only 15 founder successions were studied in the southern California area;
in addition none of the firms were publicly owned. This small number of interviews
could have introduced three issues. The first being a regional bias in that only companies
in the Southern California area were interviewed. The second being the sample size was
far less than 1% of the total population of small businesses. Finally the sampling
methodology of having the Presidents of Chamber of Commerce organizations prepare
lists of recommended companies for inclusion in the study could have excluded more
representative organizations from this research.
Even though the headquarters for the companies included in this study were
located in Southern California, seven of the companies had branch offices in major
metropolitan areas across the United States; one company even had offices in Europe.
The founders traveled to and worked in each of the branch offices. Three of the founders
that did not have multi-state organizations were extensively involved in trade
organizations that exposed them to similar companies in other parts of the United States.
Additionally many of the founders had previously worked for large commercial
organizations in other states. All of these factors combined would seem to mitigate the
behaviors of the founders that might be localized to the Southern California area of the
United States and thus possibly introduce a sampling bias.
According to a formula given by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) the number of
samples needed for a 95% confidence level for a finite population of 5,767,306 would
require a sample size of at least 384 companies. Assuming that the same level of success
was maintained that was achieved in reaching the 15 in this study companies was
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maintained in acquiring 384 interviews, the number of Chamber of Commerce Presidents
that would be need to be contacted would be 2,867 and it would take 154 months to
contact and complete the interviews. As the reader might surmise a project of this
undertaking is outside the scope of any dissertation research study.
As for the sampling methodology, a list of founder successions is not maintained
by any public agency that the researcher could find. The vast majority of founder
successions are done in companies that are not publicly traded and therefore are not
required submit any documentation of the leadership change. Given the low return rate of
two percent on unsolicited emails and letters requesting participation in a research study,
a mass email of at least 19,200 would be needed to achieve 384 interviews. The only
viable way to locate organizations that have had a founder transition was to a
combination of cluster and snowball sampling. According to Patten (2000) cluster
sampling utilizes drawing from groups of possible participants rather than from a random
group of participants. In the case of this study the sample groups were organizations that
belonged to the same local Chamber of Commerce due to the fact that the presidents of
these Chambers were the ones suggesting who would be a good candidate for the study.
Snowball or chain referral sampling is a method by which participants are asked to
suggest other people who might participate in the study (Creswell, 2002; McMillan &
Schumacher, 2006). As was noted in chapter four, 5 of the 15 participants were added to
the study via snowball sampling.
It was not the intention of this study to determine the viability of the organizations
that went through their successions. Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) Contingency Model of
the Initial Succession is meant to indicate whether or not a succession is needed and if the
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founder could delay succession. The data obtained by Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) were
public records of publicly held companies. This research’s primary goal was intended to
determine if Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) model could be used in smaller organizations.
Given that smaller organizations are often not publicly held, their financial records are
normally confidential and therefore difficult to obtain. Additionally, privately held
organizations that have failed are generally unresponsive to research inquiries.
Lastly, the solicited perceptions in this study concerning the effect of the 12 subfactors in precipitating the succession event were from the successors and not from the
founders. It is acknowledged that ultimately only the founder really knows why they
behaved as they did during the succession and what was really important to them. It was
the intention of the researcher to interview the successors rather than the founders
because the researcher believed that the successors would be less inclined to shade the
truth about the circumstances of the succession than the founders. Additionally the
founders might have died or would be much more difficult to contact than the successors.
Recommendations for Future Research
Based on information that was acquired during this qualitative study the following
is a list of recommendations for further research:
•

Conduct a study that would help to determine how often a founder identifies
themselves as the organization. In the course of this research a theme emerged
that the founder often considered themselves to be the organization and therefore
succession would be akin to the death of the organization. It was as if the founders
felt that without their presence there was no reason for the organization to exist.
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•

Conduct a study with financial advisors as to the frequency with which the
concept of leadership development for the succession is presented to their clients
in addition to a financial plan. During the interview sessions the successors often
complained that the founders did little if any training with the successors as to
how to run the organization. Of the successors that said the transition went well,
everyone of them complimented the founder on the effort that they expended in
teaching them the details of how to run the business. One even successor even
went on to say how great it was that he and the founder were working side by side
during some very rough times. It gave the successor a large measure of
confidence went the leadership role was officially passed to him.

•

Re-conduct the study with only founders who hold a minority equity position with
the organization. In this sample population only one of the organizations had
venture capital investors such that the founder held a minority equity position.
Due to the ownership position of most of the founders they were able to sidestep
any outside influences. This was the primary reason that Rubenson and Gupta’s
(1996) Contingency Model of the Initial Succession lacked explanatory power.

•

Conduct another study where both the successors and the founder’s perceptions
concerning Rubenson and Gupta’s (1996) twelve sub-factors are compared. As
was noted in the limitations section, ultimately only the founder knows what
motivated them to proceed with the initial succession. Contrasting the opinions of
the first and second leaders in the organization might illuminate fiction points
during the transition that neither leader were aware of and thus lead to improved
transition processes.
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Conclusions
This study was conducted in order to answer three questions:
1) Is the Contingency Model of the Initial Succession proposed by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) transferable to organizations of smaller size and lower
revenues?
2) Were the founders of small sized organizations planning for their eventual
succession?
3) What other factors came into play beyond those outlined by Rubenson and
Gupta (1996) during the succession process?
In the course of this study it has been determined that due to the large ownership
positions of the founders in small organizations that the Contingency Model for the Initial
Succession (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996) does not really apply. It was also discovered that
the founders of small organizations in this study only planned for their succession 40% of
the time. This low rate of succession planning by the founders in this study is in line with
the assertion of Brown and Coverley (1999) that very few organizations actual do any
succession. This study also found that a founder succession was more often initiated by
illness, old age, or family members. Six more factors came to the surface during this
study that were outside of the 12 suggested by Rubenson and Gupta (1996) and warrant
further investigation as to what degree they play a part in the succession of a founder.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Questions
1) Is the company a public company?
2) Has a transition between the founder and a new organizational leader been

completed within last past three years?
3) Is the organization currently in transition from the founder to a new

organizational leader?
4) Age of the founder at the time of transition?
5) Current age of the founder?
6) Number of years the founder was in control of the organization?
7) Size of organization at the time of transition?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?
8) What was been the overall rate of growth for the organization during the

founder’s tenure?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?
9) What was been the growth in the number of employees?
10) What was been the growth in the sales revenue?
11) What was been the growth in the number of customers?
12) If a public company, how many years passed before the organization went

public?
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13) During the tenure of the founder how much has the initial product offering or

service expanded or changed?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?
14) What level of formal education has the founder achieved before the transition?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?
15) How many years of general management experience does/did the founder

have at the time of transition?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?
16) How varied was the functional experience of the founder at the time of

management?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?
17) How much relevant industry experience did the founder have at the time of

transition?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?

18) How dispersed was the ownership of the firm at the time of transition?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?
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19) What percentage of the board of directors are neither related to the founder in
some way or would not be consider current employees of the firm?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?

20) Is there a policy of promotion from within the company for recently vacated
positions?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?

21) How much does the founder’s’ family influences the culture of the
organization?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?

22) How turbulent was the industry at the time of transition?
a. How important was this in the succession event?
b. Why or why not?

23) What planning, if any, was done prior to the need for the succession?
24) What factors or situations do you believe triggered the appointment of a new
leader in this organization?
25) What would you have done differently to improve the succession process?
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APPENDIX B
Informed Consent Form
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
Participant:
__________________________________________________________________
Principal Investigator:
_________________________________________________________
Title of Project: FOUNDER SUCCESSION IN SMALL BUSINESSES
1. I,
, agree to participate in the
research study being conducted by _____________________ under the direction
of _______________________________________.
2. I understand that the overall purpose of this research is to investigate the
applicability of the Contingency Model of Founder Succession to small
organizations.
3. I understand that my participation will be to answer a series of questions during
an approximately one hour interview about the founder succession process that
occurred in my organization. The interview will take place at the time and
location of my choosing.
4. I understand that the interview consist of approximately 25 questions. The
interview will be digitally recorded so that it can be later transcribed. If during
the transcription process an answer is determined to be difficult to understand
then a follow-up call will be conducted in order to clarify the answer given.
5. I understand that the there are certain risks and discomforts that might arise from
this research. I understand that if during the interview I feel discomfort at
answering any questions I will can stop the interview that point with no
repercussions.
6. I understand that by participating in this research other organizations that are
either planning for or who are in the midst of a founder succession may benefit
from the information gathered during this research. I understand that having
already gone through a founder succession my participation my help others to
successfully complete the succession process.
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7. I understand that my recorded interview will be transcribed by a professional
transcription service and that my information will be held in confidence. I also
understand that I may be quoted at times but that my specific identify will not be
disclosed in the quote. Once transcribed, the identifying information about my
firm specific will be excluded from the data used in the research.
8. I understand that there will be no compensation for my participation.
9. I understand that in the EVENT OF PHYSICAL INJURY resulting from the
research procedures in which I am to participate, no form of compensation is
available. Medical treatment may be provided at my own expense or at the
expense of my health care insurer which may or may not provide coverage. If I
have questions, I should contact my insurer.
10. I understand that if I have questions that are pertinent to the research, my rights
during the course of the research, or in the event that I suffer a research-related
injury I may contact: ______________________________________________
11. I understand that I will receive a copy of the consent form.
12. I understand that PARTICIPATION is voluntary; refusal to participate will
involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled. I
understand that I may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss
of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled.

____________________
Interviewee

_________
Date

I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the subject has
consented to participate.
____________________
Principal Investigator

_________
Date
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